Tuesday, 8 December 2015

India may replace global VSHORAD tender with domestic

VSHORAD launch
VSHORAD launch

India's $1.5 billion global tender for man-portable very short-range air defense (VSHORAD) systems is facing cancellation for the second time since it was launched in 2010 - this time in favor of a domestic-companies-only competition, a Ministry of Defence source said.

While the flight trials of the competing systems were completed in 2013, the tender may be cancelled because competitors MBDA, Rosoboronexport and Saab in the past have claimed there was a lack of transparency in the procurement process, the MoD source said. The government is weighing a new VSHORAD tender in the Buy and Make (India) category, restricted to Indian companies, the source said.

For the 2010 tender, Russia's Rosoboronexport fielded the Igla-S, Swedish company Saab offered the RBS 70 NG and France-based MBDA offered the Mistral system for trials.

The procurement process was also halted in 2012 as the MoD studied a proposal from US company Raytheon to supply the Stinger man-portable VSHORAD on a government-to-government basis. However, negotiations yielded no agreement because of issues relating to the transfer of technology.

Since the tender involves technology transfer, Saab had teamed with ndia's state-owned Bharat Electronics, while MBDA forged ties with privately owned Indian company Larsen & Toubro. Rosoboronexport chose to field the Igla-S system on its own.

However, should the government opt to restrict the tender to domestic companies, "fresh teaming up will be made as the private-sector defense sector has seen major new entrants like Pipavav Defence, Bharat Forge and Punj Lloyd," according to Mahindra Singh, a retired Indian Army major general.

The Indian Army is looking for VSHORAD systems to replace its aging Russian-made Igla air defense systems and wants a man-portable system weighing less than 25 kilograms with fire-and-forget capability. Other Army requirements include a capability of engaging aerial targets day or night with an effective range of 6 kilometers.

Of the 5,175 missiles and associated equipment sought under the 2010 tender, 2,315 missiles were to be delivered fully assembled and 1,260 partially assembled, with 1,000 missiles to be assembled entirely in India and 600 to be made at Indian facilities. Associated equipment includes launchers, sensors, thermal imaging sights, and command-and-control units.

But it isn't known what requirements might be included if a fresh tender for VSHORADs is issued to domestic companies, the MoD source said.

"There is an urgent need for VSHORAD systems and the order is likely to increase considering that even the Indian Air Force has a requirement of these systems," Singh said.

Friday, 4 December 2015

India finalizing plans to order 3 more Scorpene submarines

INS Kalvari of Indian Navy
INS Kalvari of Indian Navy

Faced with an ageing underwater combat arm even as China and Pakistan bolster their fleets, India is now finalizing plans to order three more French Scorpene submarines after the first six are constructed at Mazagon Docks as well as issue the tender for six new-generation stealth submarines by next year. 

India is also steadily cranking up military force-levels and infrastructure in the strategically-located Andaman and Nicobar Command in a bid to effectively counter China's strategic moves in the IOR as well as ensure security of sea lanes converging towards Malacca Strait. 

"The aim is to ensure the islands are not only well protected but also act as a strategic location for basing aircraft, warships and submarines. The proximity of A&N Islands to Malacca Strait makes them very strategic since they overlook busy sea lanes and choke points," said Navy chief Admiral Robin Dhowan on Thursday. 

On the underwater combat front, work is also underway to draw up technical parameters and select the shipyard for the construction of six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), which got "acceptance of necessity" earlier this year. "The six SSNs will be constructed under the Make in India programme," said Admiral Dhowan. 

INS Arihant, the country's first nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, called a SSBN in naval parlance, will also be commissioned next year. The other two follow-on SSBNs are in an advanced stage of construction at Vizag. "INS Arihant's sea trials (which began a year ago) are proceeding satisfactorily," said the Navy chief.

All these projects may seem a lot but remember India currently has just 13 ageing conventional diesel-electric submarines -- 10 of which are well over 25 years old -- and one SSN in INS Chakra on lease from Russia, which is not armed with nuclear missiles in line with international treaties. 

China, in sharp contrast, has 51 conventional and five nuclear submarines, and is on course to induct another five JIN-class SSBNs with the 7,400-km range JL-2 missiles. The frequent forays of Chinese conventional and nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean region, with halts from Colombo to Karachi, has only added to India's strategic challenges in the region over the last couple of years. The combat edge India has over Pakistan is also fast eroding, with Islamabad recently ordering eight more advanced diesel-electric submarines from Beijing. 

The Navy, however, is nonchalant. "Collaboration between Pakistan and China is nothing new, nor is their development of Gwadar port. The geostrategic environment keeps on changing. We take note of the developments and factor them into our own plans," said Admiral Dhowan. 

Asked about China's plans for an overseas military logistics facility in Djibouti, he said: "It's their plan. We are focusing on our strategy of shaping a favourable and positive maritime environment with presence and cooperation with IOR countries." 

"Today, our Navy is a multi-dimensional, networked force, which is combat-ready to take on any challenge in the IOR as well as protect the country's huge maritime interests," he said, adding his force's "operational footprint" had steadily increased over the years from the Western Pacific in the east to the North Atlantic in the west. 

The maritime capability perspective plan has laid down the route for the Navy to become a 198-warship and 600-aircraft force by 2027, even though it's currently grappling with critical operational deficiencies in submarines, multi-role helicopters and minesweepers.

Sunday, 11 October 2015

INS Arihant to undergo missile tests, to be inducted by Feb 2016

INS Arihant
INS Arihant

India's first indigenously developed nuclear submarine Arihant, which has 'successfully' completed sea trials held so far, will undergo its maiden missile firing test this month, a top defence source said. The aim is to handover the submarine to the Indian navy during the International Fleet Review scheduled in February next year in Vishakapatnam, they said.

"The tests held so far have been successful. We will, this month, fire the Nirbhay Missile from the submarine which will be followed by the firing of another type of missile", sources said.

While Nirbhay is a 1000-km long range subsonic cruise missile, the next missile would be India's first Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), which has a range of about 700 kms. These would be followed by another few rounds of tests.

India plans to build at least two more Arihant-class submarines. India had started building the Arihant in the 1990s under its highly secretive ATV (Advanced Technology Vessel) programme. 

Though the Arihant was initially supposed to be a fast-attack submarine, the project was realigned to make it a ballistic missile submarine following the nuclear test conducted by India in 1998.

After its launch in 2009, INS Arihant went through extensive tests including harbor acceptance trials with the on-board reactor going critical in 2013. It left harbor for its sea trials in December 2014.

Wednesday, 2 September 2015

Meet Nirmaljit Singh Sekhon, the only Indian Air Force officer to win the Param Vir Chakra

Nirmaljit Singh Sekhon
Nirmaljit Singh Sekhon

Nirmaljit Singh Sekhon was born in the village of Isewal Dakha in Ludhiana District of Punjab. Sekhon hailed from an army background as his father Tarlochan Singh Sekhon was a flight lieutenant. He was commissioned as a Flying Officer in the Indian Air Force in 1967.

Pakistan Air Force, during the war of 1971, had decided on the strategy to neutralize Amritsar, Pathankot and Srinagar airfields as they were crucial to their plans at the time. No. 26 squadron, based at Peshawar, was assigned with the task to carry strikes on Srinagar Airfield. 

Nirmaljit Singh Sekhon was on readiness duty with “The Flying Bullets” of IAF, flying the Folland Gnat fighter aircraft based at Srinagar. When his airfield was attacked by PAF’s Force F-86 Sabre jets, Sekhon rolled for take-off as the No. 2 behind his leader Flt. Lt. Ghumman in a two-Gnat formation. 

The daily attacks by Sabres had caused damage to the runway but the repair gangs always ensured that the runway was never out of permanent service. So, when the Sabres of Pakistani commander Changazi, Dotani, Andrabi and Mir attacked the airfield carrying 500 lbs bombs each, Sekhon lost no time in singling out the first Sabre Pair, which was forming its original position after the bombing run. Nirmaljit’s leader Lt. Ghuman lost contact with the wingman, and therefore, Sekhon was left with six Pakistani Sabres on his tail gunning for his aircraft.

But Nirmaljit never lost sight of those two Sabres and quickly settled his aim on one of them. “I am getting behind one but the other is getting an edge on me,” is how Sekhon had described the situation to his controllers. But as soon as he made contact with the Sabre in front of him, he could feel the air getting thicker on his own tail. While he was busy neutralizing the Pakistani aircraft in front of him another Sabre had come up on his tail.

Nirmaljit, in order to evade the Sabre behind him, started going in circles and it seemed for a while that Nirmaljit had succeeded as the Pakistani commander Andrabi’s voice crackled on the radio, “Three is Winchester” meaning he had exhausted his ammo. Sekhon had successfully hit one Sabre and set another one ablaze which was seen heading towards Rajauri sector covered in smoke.

During the dogfight, Sekhon’s fighter sustained heavy damages and he failed to eject out of the Gnat as the flight control system had failed. Sekhon went down with the aircraft but his legacy was established on that day in the mountains. Coming out on top of six Pakistani Sabres had odds of 1:6, and Sekhon did it in style making the enemy run for cover.

Nirmaljit Singh Sekhon was awarded India’s highest wartime medal for gallantry, the Param Vir Chakra for his exploits in the field, and thereby, he became the only officer from the Indian Air Force to be decorated with the prestigious award.

Decisive win in 1965 war: Parrikar

The then prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and army officers atop a captured Pakistani tank
The then prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and army officers atop a captured Pakistani tank

India delivered a telling blow to Pakistan across the Western front, added Army Chief General Dalbir Singh.

Presenting a new narrative of the India Pakistan war of 1965, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar on Tuesday said Pakistan made some “misplaced assumptions and wrong calculations” and it was a “decisive victory” for India though sceptics call it a draw.

“Many sceptics call the outcome a draw, but I disagree. My impression is it was a decisive victory to India,” Mr. Parrikar said at a seminar on the occasion of the golden jubilee celebrations of the 1965 war.
Speaking on the occasion Army Chief General Dalbir Singh said that India had delivered a “telling blow” to Pakistan across the Western front.

As part of the commemoration, two books on the war supported by the Army and the air Force were launched by Vice President Hamid Ansari.

The book, 1965, Turning the Tide: How India Won the War, is the effort of the Army’s think tank, Centre for Land Warfare Studies and has been written by defence analyst Nitin Gokhale. The second book, The duels of the Himalayan eagle: The first Indo-Pak war, was written By Air Marshal (retd.) Bharat Kumar and supported by the Air Force.

Mr. Parrikar said that 1965 war did not receive due “attention and analysis” and called for inclusion of the books in school education.

Veterans and experts while agreeing that India had an upper hand, however, differed on the view that it was a victory.

Major Chandrakant Singh, a decorated veteran agreed that India had an “upper hand” but felt that no one had won. “The Pakistani’s were definitely defeated in their aim of cutting off Kashmir but it is not a victory for India. However, credit must be given to our Generals and jawans for taking on the modern equipment that Pakistan had,” he said.

On a similar note Srinath Raghavan, Senior Fellow at Centre for Policy Research said the key was how the victory was defined.

“As we do not have access to most of the documents, the official history is the best source available. Official historians are clear that this war is not the kind of victory that it is being made out and mistakes were made both in strategic and operational realms,” he said.

Monday, 31 August 2015

Indira Gandhi considered military strike on Pakistan’s nuke sites, claims CIA document

Indira Gandhi
Indira Gandhi

Returning to power in 1980, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had considered a military strike on Pakistan’s nuclear installations to prevent it from acquiring weapons capabilities, a declassified CIA document has claimed.

Such a consideration by the then Indian Prime Minister was being made when the US was in an advanced stage of providing its fighter jets F-16 to Pakistan, says the September 8, 1981, document titled ‘India’s Reaction to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan’, which was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

A redacted version of the 12-page document was posted on the CIA website in June this year, according to which the then Indian government led by Gandhi in 1981 was concerned about the progress made by Pakistan on its nuclear weapons programme and believed that Islamabad was steps away from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The US had the same assessment.

“In the extreme case, if Indian concerns increase over the next two or three months, we believe the conditions could be ripe for a decision by Prime Minister Gandhi to instigate a military confrontation with Pakistan, primarily to provide a framework for destroying Pakistan’s nuclear facilities,” the then highly sensitive CIA report claimed.

At the time of writing of the report, the CIA said Gandhi had not taken any such decision in that regard. According to the report, as Pakistan was in an advanced stage of producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons, Gandhi evidently responded to the threat by authorising Indian nuclear test preparations.

“In February (1981), excavation was begun in the Thar desert to permit the underground explosion of an Indian test device on short notice,” the CIA said, adding that in May, preparations had been completed by India for a 40-kiloton nuclear test.

The CIA said India reportedly was to explode the device about one week after the expected Pakistani test. “Evidently, the Indian Government calculated that a Pakistani nuclear explosion per se would not constitute a national security threat, and that the damage to India’s image of pre-eminence in the region could be minimised by a resumption of the peaceful nuclear explosive (PNE) programme,” the CIA said.

“Prime Minister Gandhi probably has not made a decision to exercise a military option against Pakistan. In the extreme case, if India’s concern about deliveries of F-16s to Pakistan increases before the optimum time for exercising the military option (in October or November according to one report), the conditions could be ripe for Prime Minister Gandhi to carry out the contingency strike plan,” it said.
“Our best estimate, however, is that India will follow a wait and see strategy,” the report added.

Friday, 14 August 2015

Eight Army men get a huge pat for ‘daring’ Myanmar operations

Army personnel involved with Myanmar operations posing in front of ALH Dhruv
Army personnel involved with Myanmar operations posing in front of ALH Dhruv

Eight Army personnel from 21 Para Regiment who took part in operations across the Myanmar border in June are among the 67 gallantry award recipients approved by President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Pranab Mukherjee on the eve of 69th Independence Day.

The “daring” Myanmar operation along the “Indo-Myanmar border” also found mention in Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s customary Independence Day address to the armed forces personnel. “I compliment the Special Forces for undertaking this surgical strike smoothly and without any casualty on our side,” Mr. Parrikar said.

The 67 gallantry awards include two Kirti Chakras, 10 Shaurya Chakras, one Bar to Sena Medal, 49 Sena Medals, two Nao Sena Medals and three Vayu Sena Medals.

The Kirti Chakra awardees include Lieutenant Colonel Nectar Sanjenbam who led the 21 Para Regiment into Myanmar and Naib Subedar Rajesh Kumar (posthumously) who died fighting terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir in October last year.

Of the 10 Shaurya Chakras while five went to the army, Navy and Air Force got one each and three were conferred to personnel under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Colonel MN Rai from Gorkha regiment who died fighting terrorists in Kashmir in January was conferred Shaurya Chakra posthumously.

Commander Mohan Milind Mokashi, Commanding Officer of INS Sumitra, got a Shaurya Chakra for playing a pivotal role in evacuating Indian nationals from Yemen under ‘Operation Rahat.’

“His brave efforts resulted in successful evacuation of 1621 evacuees, during five different operations, which he undertook from the Port of Aden, Port Ash Shihr and Port Al Hodeidah,” the citation reads.

Coast Guard personnel were awarded one President’s Tatrakshak Medal (PTM) and seven Tatrakshak Medals (TM) for displaying conspicuous acts of gallantry, distinguished and meritorious services. In addition, the President has also awarded one PTM for distinguished service and two TMs for meritorious service.

Commandant Chandra Shekhar Joshi, commander of Coast Guard ship Rajratan, which was involved in an operation that led to sinking of a Pakistani boat in December last year, got the President’s Tatrakshak Medal.

Friday, 7 August 2015

Missing some muscle

Border Security Force personnel patrolling the fenced border with Pakistan
Border Security Force personnel patrolling the fenced border with Pakistan

The capture of fidayeen Mohammad Naved alias Qasim Khan - call him Qasab II - during a terrorist attack in Udhampur, just days after the assault on Gurdaspur, is a significant achievement of the security forces and village defence squads. It also shows the determination of the handlers in Pakistan to disrupt and derail the 68th Independence Day celebrations and the proposed NSA-level talks and test the new government's tolerance threshold.

In a significant policy shift the government has not called off the NSA talks as it is determined to confront Pakistan with the live evidence of a Qasab II. However, the element that has been missing from India's policy of combating cross-border terrorism for decades is retribution.

While deeply analytical, the mention of an Indian deterrent to fend off such terror attacks from Pakistan is conspicuous by its absence in recent articles on the Gurdaspur attack. It is this missing ingredient of India’s internal security policy that has encouraged Islamabad to expand the geography and frequency of cross-border terrorism beyond J&K to Punjab, for the first time after the 26/11 strikes on Mumbai in 2008.

No deterrence

Speaking in Mumbai this week on the use of hard power, National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval emphasised the need for India to have a “deterrence against attacks on its soil”. This rephrasing of similar comments made earlier suggests that an appropriate but belated response is in the making.

In his very erudite article, M. K. Narayanan, a former NSA, writes at length about the challenges posed by terrorism emanating from Pakistan. He proposes that as cross-border terrorism intensified in J&K, it declined in Punjab. Now, he says, as terrorism has declined in J&K, it may return in Punjab, where conditions are ripe for an escalation . He is right. The linkage between Kashmir and Khalistan was made by the ISI in its famous “K2 Project” attempted in early 1990s but the idea of Khalistan was nipped in the bud by the Punjab police.

However, while Mr Narayanan makes an inventory of defensive measures, there is not a whiff of how to punish Pakistan. The steadfast pursuit of “not losing an inch of land” has, sadly, bred a passive and defensive mindset among Indian security forces.

In the run-up to the hanging of Yakub Memon, the word 'deterrent' was dropped by political leaders and intellectuals like confetti at a wedding. Retribution has a sobering effect on sponsors of terror and Pakistan's indefatigable pursuit of it has been whetted by the absence of a response. The attacks in Gurdaspur and Udhampur are stark reminders of this.

Policy dead end

Despite a strenuous spin to its Pakistan policy, portrayed as more muscular than that of the UPA , it is becoming clear that the new government has hit a cul de sac. After raising the bar for resuming the dialogue process, it has had to make a dramatic climbdown. As the international border and LoC resonate with artillery, there is no sign of restoration of calm.Terror and talks will go hand-in-hand when the two NSAs, armed with their respective dossiers on Gurdaspur and Udhampur, and R&AW meet on August 23 and 24 at New Delhi.

What has changed is the language of warnings to Pakistan. Home Minister Rajnath Singh has threatened to give a 'befitting reply'. In a chaotic Rajya Sabha, over the din, he vowed “an effective and forceful response” to the Dinanagar assault by the Pakistani fidayeen whom he referred to as “enemies of India”. Earlier, Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar had made a generic remark that the response to terror will be “disproportionate and unpredictable and at a time and place of our choosing”. Be it Dinanagar or Udhampur, the charade of a “befitting reply” is repeated ad nauseum on Indian TV channels, where supercharged anchors, accompanied by their over-enthusiastic panelists, pay back their Pakistani counterparts in high decibels with choice invectives, recounting the history of treachery in fouled battles and clandestine campaigns. Calling Pakistanis 'cowards' appears to be the acme of retribution.

We are told that new fences and walls are to be put up to prevent terrorists from swimming across the Ravi river that the fidayeen crossed last month to surprise the Dinanagar police station. In the past we have built canals and ditch-cum-bunds, erected minefields and smart fencing on the IB and LoC and adopted anti-and counter-infiltration and counter-insurgency grids by thickening troop density. These measures have contained insurgency in J&K, but not brought an end to it. The focus now, as in the past, is strengthening defensive measures.

Forceful language

Is India being self-deterred from delivering a befitting reply? Over the last several months, signals emanating from NSA Ajit Doval and Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar were very encouraging. Mr Parrikar spoke about using terrorists to remove terrorists and re-creating deep assets dismantled by default earlier. Mr Doval has been urging Pakistan to end terrorism and at least once warned: “you do another Mumbai, you lose Balochistan.”

One must assume that the befitting reply - effective, forceful, disproportionate and unpredictable - is in the making, to be delivered at a time and place of India's choosing. Translating words into an actionable deterrent is the challenge for policymakers.

Two other aspects require attention: prevention of and a quicker response to the fidayeen assaults. The guru of counter-terrorism K .P.S. Gill, under whose charge Khalistan terrorism was ended in Punjab, stated after the Dinanagar attack: “You don't prepare for terrorism after it has happened.” Fidayeen infiltrate across the LoC/IB, strike targets in Jammu and some even get away. Over the years, the Indian security forces have frequently dealt with terrorists holed up in villages and hideouts in the Srinagar vallley and elsewhere. All the operational experience to end a crisis situation has been assimilated but not institutionalised for re-use. That is why units take inordinately long to finish the operation.

The lackadaisical deportment of personnel at the Dinanagar police station showed the absence of operational readiness and preparedness despite the general alert. Counter-terrorism skills, acquired by the Punjab police in early 1990s, were obviously not passed down; else the response would have been more professional and the police post would not have caved in. It took all of 12 hours for Punjab police's SWAT team, trained in Israel, to overcome three fidayeen. As one watched on TV the melee of troops, police and onlookers, it was obvious that the lessons of Mumbai had not been heeded: of no live coverage of counter-terrorism operations. Closure was brought half a day after the attack, with the fidayeen given live coverage and the ultimate oxygen of publicity. An American woman trapped in Taj Mumbai during 26/11 on her rescue at the end of the operation while exiting the hotel angrily told a police officer: “there were six terrorists. And you took three days”.

In Dinanagar and Udhampur, Pakistan was testing India's response to a terror attack, the first outside J&K after Mumbai. Some government sources are claiming that the civilian government in Pakistan was unaware of these attacks. That is possible, even probable. However, the autonomy of the Punjab-based terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammad acting independently of the ISI is unlikely. Either way, it ducks two questions: how will India respond to the next big attack sourced in Pakistan; and why is the deterrent overt or covert or both, taking so long to materialise? Is it the lack of political will? Because the man on the street is asking “iska kuchh hoga” (will something be done of this) to end cross-border terrorism. The government must give a befitting reply.

-Ashok. K Mehta
Originally published on "The Hindu".
(Maj. Gen. Mehta (retd.) was a founder- member of the Defence Planning Staff, now the Integrated Defence Staff.)

Thursday, 6 August 2015

Chinese media see border meet a step forward

Indian Army and PLA officers before border meeting
Indian Army and PLA officers before border meeting

The Chinese state media is praising the opening of the fifth border meeting point between India and China at Daulat Beg Oldie in Ladakh as a major step to keep the frontiers calm.

Yet, acknowledging that the process to strengthen peace and tranquillity was being incrementally and consistently strengthened, diplomatic sources told The Hindu that it would be “premature” to conclude that Sino-Indian ties have already been fundamentally realigned.

“That could happen and we are hopeful, but we are still looking at specific and definitive markers which would indeed demonstrate and repose confidence that the relationship has been firmly re-tracked,” the sources observed.

People’s Daily, China’s official newspaper, is quoting from an article which had first appeared in the state-run tabloid Global Times, in which analysts said that Sino-Indian ties were “getting warmer in many aspects” as this was the second border meeting point to be set up between the two countries over the past year.

The August 1 designation of Daulat Beg Oldie as a border meeting point was also symbolically significant as it coincided with the celebration of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Day.

In May, the two countries opened another border meeting point in Kibithu in Arunachal Pradesh, called South Tibet by China. There have also been media reports citing the scope of complementarity and reconciliation of China’s Belt and Road initiative with India’s Act East Policy.

However, sources pointed out that the Indian side was yet to pick any clear signals, which would suggest that the Chinese position was shifting on big-ticket bilateral issues. For instance, during the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Ufa in Russia on the sidelines of the summit of the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping, “there was no visible change in the Chinese position on the China-Pakistan economic corridor, which passed through parts of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir,” the sources observed.

During his visit to China in May, the Prime Minister had also imparted urgency to clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), without prejudice to the positions held by either country on the final resolution of the boundary question.

The sources stressed that India had defined a minimalist approach, where tensions would be significantly eased if the two sides shared information on each other’s perception of the LAC.
Without elaborating, the sources pointed out that the Chinese had previously signalled a shift in their position on resolving the crisis in Afghanistan, but of late Beijing “did not seem to be particularly accommodative of Indian interests” in Kabul.

The Chinese were also following a hyphenated approach by tying support to India’s membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), with Pakistan’s request, the sources said.

“The Sino-Indian relationship has definitely been energised in all spheres at the highest level over the past year but we are still waiting to scale some of the defining hurdles,” they observed.

Nagaland: A long road to peace

Naga men performing a traditional war dance during the Hornbill festival
Naga men performing a traditional war dance during the Hornbill festival

It is a 97-year-old struggle. To initiate even the beginnings of closure is a major breakthrough. And to have achieved that by recognising the Naga people’s pride, culture and history crowns the accord with renewed hope.

Poignancy, laced with a sense of Naga pride and aspirations, can best describe the responses to the August 3 Naga Peace Accord signed between the NSCN (I-M) and the government of India. This can only be understood by talking to those living in Nagaland. On August 4, I received an early morning phone call from Zunheboto town (Zunheboto in Sumi dialect refers to a flowering shrub) in Nagaland. The sober voice of one of my young Naga friends broke the silence across the miles as she whispered, “Sister, finally, we do have closure, right?” followed by a spell of silence pregnant with meaning. I knew that she was brimming with emotions — pride amidst hurt; dignity amidst insecurity. I recalled Martin Luther King, Jr.’s lines from the movie Selma: “this is a demonstration of our dignity”.

That is what the Naga struggle has meant to me: a demonstration of the Nagas’ pride and dignity as a people. This, notwithstanding the violence and the insurgency, the fear and the insecurity and a life lived in uncertainty. Naga-inhabited areas resonate with a sense of unique history and culture - the National Socialist Council of Nagaland NSCN (Isak-Muivah) represents both.

The ethnic Naga movement began its journey in 1918 with the formation of the Naga Club by 20 Naga members of the French Labour Corps, who had served in World War-I in Europe. The wartime knowledge motivated the few who came in contact with the European battlefield to politically organise themselves as a distinct ethnic entity. It also aroused in them a feeling of Naga nationalism, which shaped the idea of a ‘Naga nation’.

The Club submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1929, in which it stated that the people of Naga areas and those of mainland India had nothing in common between them and hence the Nagas should be left alone. In 1946, Naga National Council (NNC), a successor to the Naga Club, was formed under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo. Phizo, with the collaboration of eight other Nagas, declared Naga independence on August 14, 1947. In a 1951 speech, Phizo argued, “In the name of the Naga National Council and on behalf of the people and citizens of Nagaland, I wish to make our stand and our national position clear. We are a democratic people, and as such, we have been struggling for a Separate Sovereign State of Nagaland in a democratic way through constitutional means as it is so called. We shall continue to do so”.

It is important to note that several efforts were made to resolve the Naga issue. On June 27-28, 1947, the Akbar Hydari Agreement was signed between the then Governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari and the NNC, in which the Nagas’ right to freely develop themselves was respected. However, Clause 9 of the Hydari Agreement created divisions as it stated, “The Governor of Assam as the Agent of the Government of the Indian Union will have a special responsibility for a period of 10 years to ensure the observance of the agreement, at the end of this period the Naga Council will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding the future of Naga people arrived at”. This was interpreted by the NNC as terminating in sovereignty.

The NNC took to arms in 1955. Indian security forces responded with counter-insurgency operations, which resulted in the imposition of the Assam Disturbed Areas Act on the Naga Hills on August 27, 1955. This later became the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, further amended in 1972.

Those were turbulent times in Naga history, with the landscape plagued by violence, counter-insurgency and civilian deaths. The hills came alive with a complex mix of political ideology, a desire for self-determination, ethnic alignments and tribal divisions. It was not an easy situation to deal with. The insurgency and the deployment of armed forces resulted in civilian deaths.

In 1963, as a mechanism for conflict resolution, the Nagaland State was established. Yet, the insurgency continued, as most Naga inhabited areas were left outside the purview of the new State. In 1964, a Nagaland Peace Mission was created and a ceasefire agreement was signed that lasted till 1968. After years of violence, another effort at peace was attempted with the signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975, where the NNC members agreed to give up violence and accept the Indian Constitution.

However, Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu, then members of the NNC, interpreted the Shillong Accord as a complete sellout and revolted, going on to form the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. S.S. Khaplang, who now heads NSCN (K), was a member of the unified NSCN that split in 1988 to form the two divisions: NSCN (I-M) and the NSCN (K).

This history of the struggle is important as a backdrop to understand the significance of the Naga peace accord signed on August 03. NSCN (I-M) under Muivah and Swu have held to the ceasefire since its signing in 1997.

The ceasefire by NSCN (I-M) attained greater significance after NSCN (K) abrogated its ceasefire on March 27, 2015. Also, unlike NSCN (K), whose leader Khaplang has failed to maintain unity within the group, the NSCN (I-M)’s leaders and cadres have stayed with it since 1988.

Where the NSCN (I-M) has succeeded while groups like NSCN (K) have failed is in establishing a presence across all Naga-inhabited areas. It has achieved this by holding regular People’s Consultative Meetings (PCMs) with groups such as the Naga Hoho; Naga Students’ Federation; Forum for Naga Reconciliation; and the larger Naga civil society across States.

The PCMs have reinforced the much-needed local social networks that are the mainstay of any insurgent group. This largely representative structure has also kept violence in check and created an accountability mechanism where aspirations for Naga dignity and pride have taken centre stage.

It is notable that the NSCN (I-M) has shown flexibility in relegating the sovereignty clause to the background and bringing to the fore the issue of Naga identity - a more negotiable factor with the Central government.

Consequently, as I read through the Prime Minister’s speech at the signing ceremony that set the framework for a peaceful resolution to the Naga insurgency, his emphasis on restoring a sense of dignity, pride and respect to the Naga people stood out. This, as the 97-year-old Naga struggle will tell you, is the core issuefor the Nagas - a recognition of their history, dignity and culture.

The details of the Accord are yet to be made public, especially on how the NSCN (I-M)’s complicated political demand for a ‘Greater Nagalim’, comprising areas in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur will be negotiated. However, the biggest breakthrough is that the group has agreed to give up violence and resolve all issues peacefully. For now, this Accord has ushered in hope, bringing joy mixed with poignant memories to my friend from Zunheboto and that matters the most.

(Dr. Namrata Goswami is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. E-mail: namygoswami@gmail.com)

Sunday, 31 May 2015

INS Vikrant undocking postponed to Monday

INS Vikrant in dock
INS Vikrant in dock

Siltation and a minor technical glitch in lowering the building bay dock gate, which was last operated when the maiden indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was taken in post-launch for the second phase of work a year-and-a-half ago, have forced the Cochin Shipyard to defer the undocking of the carrier to Monday.

The aircraft carrier was to have been undocked on completion of structural work on Saturday.
Flooding of the dock and ballasting of the carrier, weighing about 26,000 tonnes minus the ballast, had begun on Friday.

However, unfavourable tide and a bit of siltation at the dock mouth besides a minor glitch with the dock gate forced the undocking to be put off. Sources said the carrier would continue to be outfitted for over a year-and-a-half after undocking when the second phase of construction would draw to a close. The yard considers this to be the most challenging phase during which cabling, piping, accommodation facility, air conditioning and ventilation systems would be done.

Once complete, the carrier will have some 2,300 compartments.

Monday, 25 May 2015

IAF legend Jumbo Majumdar’s medals set for return to India

Wing Commander Karun Krishna 'Jumbo' Majumdar
Wing Commander Karun Krishna 'Jumbo' Majumdar

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has purchased the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) and Bar awarded to Wing Commander Karun Krishna 'Jumbo' Majumdar from a London auction house.

Majumdar, widely referred to as the 'Father of the IAF', was born in Kolkata in 1913. Grandson of W C Bonnerjee, the first president of Indian National Congress, Majumdar was commissioned to No. 1 Squadron in the mid-1930s. Upon his promotion as squadron leader, he took over its reins in June 1941 at Miranshah, NWFP (now in Pakistan).

From there, the squadron was posted to the Toungoo airfield in Burma. The Japanese attacked the next day and destroyed a number of Allied installations and aircraft, but Majumdar's squadron remained unscathed. Jumbo immediately planned a retaliatory attack on Mae-Haungsan, from where the Japanese had taken off.

At the time, the Lysander had never been used for bombing. "The next day, when Majumdar took off in a solitary Lysander armed with two 250-lb bombs, the New Zealanders in the No.67 RAF Squadron who shared Toungoo, sent an escort of two Buffalo fighters in sheer admiration for the young Indian. He flew at a low level, almost skimming tree tops, to achieve complete surprise and dropped the bombs on a hangar, destroying it along with the aircraft inside," a senior officer said.

"The next day, Majumdar led his whole squadron in to bomb the airfield, destroying buildings, wireless stations and aircraft on the ground," the officer added. "Majumdar was awarded the DFC for his leadership of the squadron during the Burma Campaign, becoming the first Indian officer to be decorated with this award in World War II," the officer said.

Jumbo then served in Europe and received his Bar to the DFC for this service in January 1945. On February 17, 1945, Wing Commander Jumbo Majumdar was killed during an aerobatic sortie in a Hawker Hurricane.

"His DFC and Bar and other decorations were passed on to his son and subsequently sold to an auction house in London. After we came to know of this, efforts were made to purchase them. Retired IAF officer Air Marshal Anil Chopra also offered to spend his pension funds to get the medals back.

Finally, the IAF intervened and bought the decorations, barely a few days before they were to go under the hammer. They will be brought back to India and displayed at the Air Force Museum," the officer added.

Army to get 114 Dhanush by 3 years

Dhanush during trials
Dhanush during trials

The Army’s quest for new artillery is nearing completion with the indigenous gun upgraded by the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) clearing trials. The Army has placed an indent for 114 guns in the first phase and these will be delivered in three years, informed sources said.

“After the Pokhran fiasco with one barrel-burst, Dhanush barrels were tested in Sikkim under cold conditions and in other temperatures - and came out with flying colours. The Army is fully satisfied,” informed the officials.

A Dhanush prototype suffered a barrel burst during firing trials at Pokhran in August 2013 which delayed the process.

The initial deal for 114 guns is expected to cost around Rs.1,600 crore. Pleased with the performance of the gun, the Army has given strong indications of an additional order for 481 guns, sources added.

The Dhanush is an upgraded version of the Swedish 155-mm Bofors howitzers bought by India in the mid-1980s based on the original design. It is a 155-mm, 45-calibre gun with a maximum effective range of 38 km in salvo mode compared to the 39-calibre, 27-km range of the original guns. It is 80 per cent indigenous, with the APU (auxiliary power unit), electronic dial sights and a few other small items being imported.

The Army is desperately short of new long-range artillery, having failed to induct any new gun after the Bofors scandal. Recently, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) headed by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar approved a revised proposal from BAE Systems for 145 Ultra-Light Howitzers for mountainous areas under a government-to-government deal with the United States.

Additionally last November, the DAC cleared the process for purchase of 814 mounted gun systems through the ‘Buy and Make’ category to be built by an Indian private partner in collaboration with a foreign manufacturer.

Friday, 15 May 2015

HF-24 Marut, first Indian designed jet fighter

HAL HF 24 Marut
HAL HF 24 Marut

This is the story of India's first indigenously designed jet fighter the HF-24 Marut. It was a landmark achievement for the 1950s and 60s and I don’t wish to take anything away from that. Nevertheless this tale is narrated with what I hope is a balanced objectivity and not a nostalgic applaud. I have tried to balance between things we can be proud of, things we didn't do so well and lessons we ought to have learnt but may not have.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

India, in 1955, was a young nation full of enthusiasm for building the economy. A lot of projects were tried for the first time under the national objective of creating our own manufacturing and design capabilities. One such endeavour was to design and build in India, for the first time, our very own jet fighter. This was ambitious to say the least at a time when we had just started assembling diesel locomotives, had never built a major ship, had just started assembly of motor cars, possessed little aluminum smelting capacity etc etc. This was Pandit Nehru's vision and the IAF (Indian Air Force) enthusiastically went along. At the time of the Marut's conception, the domestic aviation industry's only design experience amounted to designing and manufacturing the HT-2, a piston engine propeller driven trainer. Whatever aircraft manufacturing capability existed resulted from the license assembly of the Vampire Fighter Bomber FBMk.52 and Trainer TMk.55. To have considered building a supersonic capable aircraft, given such limited capabilities, bordered on audacity. The only aircraft manufacturing capability lay in Hindustan Aircraft Ltd (HAL) set up by Walchand Hirachand in the 1930s and nationalized by the Government subsequently.

The HT-2 propeller driven primary trainer, this represented the only indigenous design capability in India at the time of the decision to design & build the Marut. The HT-2 was designed by Dr VM Ghatge and served the IAF and the Army Aviation Corps for 25 years. 172 were manufactured of which 12 were exported to Ghana. 

The building of the Marut (Spirit of the Tempest), as this aircraft was to be called, was the first attempt of its kind anywhere outside the four major powers of USA, USSR, UK and France to build a supersonic jet fighter. Whatever else one might say the gumption deserves admiration. The political, bureaucratic and I dare say military hierarchies did not have a proper appreciation of the supply chain infrastructure and quality control challenges that would need to be overcome.

AIR STAFF REQUIREMENT

The Marut was conceived to meet an Air Staff Requirement (ASR), that called for a multi-role aircraft suitable for both high-altitude interception and low-level ground attack. The specified performance attributes called for a speed of Mach 2.0 at altitude, a ceiling of 60,000 feet (18,290 m) and a combat radius of 500 miles (805 km). Furthermore, the Air Staff Requirement demanded that the basic design be suitable for adaptation as an advanced trainer, an all-weather fighter and for 'navalization' as a shipboard aircraft. It was directed that this aircraft be developed within the country. Nations with advanced military design and manufacturing capabilities rarely, if ever, put out specifications that are such all singing all dancing renditions. A military aircraft is designed to play one role well, a second role moderately well and sometimes , only sometimes, a third role in a limited form. Unfortunately out of lack of experience (and in my opinion a willingness to apply common sense) the Air Staff Requirement was too wide and reflected lack of clarity of aims and a complete lack of understanding of what it takes to design and build a fighter as opposed to flying one. It is like saying - I want a car that drives like a BMW 3 (Mach 2.0), suitable for both high and low altitudes (drive well on a race track as well on Delhi's rutted roads), can carry payload like a Isuzu D-Max pick-up (low level ground attack payload) and have the toughness of a 4-wheel drive cross country mud slogger (capable of all weather capabilities & navalization). The combat radius of ~800 kms was beyond the ken of the most efficient fighter turbojet even in the USA of the 1950s. These ranges were not achieved till military turbofan engines like the Rolls Royce Spey (on the Hawker Buccaneer, 1960s) or Rolls Royce Adour (Sepecat Jaguar, 1970s) amongst others came into play. All weather was at best in an experimental rudimentary stage even in USA and USSR in 1956 and no IAF aircraft of 1956 even carried a gun ranging radar let alone a search & track one. While I don’t wish to be too critical these were overly ambitious specifications for 1955 even for the UK, France or USSR. As an aside, it might be worth noting that the ASR for the current Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas, in mid-1980s, followed the same concept of all singing all dancing and (partly due to that) it is sadly still some way off from full operational service 30 years later. The only other aircraft of the 1950s and 1960s that was designed to similar specifications as the Marut and carried a requirement for navalization + all-weather was the legendary McDonnell Douglas F4 Phantom of the US Air Force and Navy. And let's remember the Americans were then and today the foremost in aviation R&D, design and production know-how. And even with the Phantom the Americans lost out on maneuverability.

Dr VM Ghatge, India's senior most aeronautical designer was the only voice against the Marut. He prescribed a more balanced step by step approach to building the nation's aviation industry by first designing & building propeller trainers, then basic jet trainers, then light attack fighter-bombers and then a more advanced light multi-role fighter and to do this in stages over 2 decades. In retrospect his was, in my opinion, the more sensible approach. But Ghatge's voice was drowned out.

Nehru tried to attract leading aeronautical designers from the west to work for India on this project. It was to his credit that he convinced Dr. Kurt Tank (of Focke Wulf fame) to take up this assignment along with his able deputy Engineer Mittelhuber. Both arrived in Bangalore in August 1956. As head of the design team it was Kurt Tank who would give the design shape and substance. 

HAL in 1956, possessed only three senior Indian design engineers and the entire design department boasted only 54 personnel. It had no hangar space for construction of prototypes, no machine shop for prototype engineering, no suitable test equipment, structural test rigs or a flight test laboratory. In fact even the runway length was inadequate for a jet fighter prototype. It is to the credit of HAL team of that era that all this was created from scratch while Kurt Tank built up the design & prototype team of over 850 personnel including 18 German designers. 

DESIGNING & BUILDING THE MARUT

A full scale representation (wooden glider) of the projected fighter was ready by early 1959. A test program was initiated with this glider on 1 April 1959. The new design was given the designation of Hindustan Fighter 24 or simply HF-24.

Glider tests for aerodynamics started in April 1959. 78 test flights were conducted with the gliders which were released between 12,000 and 15,000 feet altitude. Use of wooden gliders was an integral part of Kurt Tank's style of design testing.

Assembly of the first HF-24 prototype (HF-001) began in April 1960 and after a comprehensive three month ground test programme, HF-001 (later re-numbered BR 462), with the late Wing Commander (later Group Captain) Suranjan Das at the controls, flew for the first time on 17 June 1961. In the circumstances this was a commendably short period of 15 months from starting to put together the prototype to first flight. 

HF-001, the first prototype was first subjected to several days of ground run testing to check if at a basic level the controls, engines, fuel systems, hydraulics, electrics actually work in co-ordination. 

Wing Commander (later group Captain) Suranjan Das, India's foremost test pilot, flew the HF-001 for the first time on 17th June, 1961. He led the test flying on the Marut as well as the later Kiran jet trainer. Earlier he had led the test flying for the Gnat. Tragically, he was killed in 1970 when testing a more advanced version of the Marut.

On 27th June 1961 they built up enough confidence and test hours to show case the prototype to Prime Minister Nehru. The prototype was re-numbered BR462. By November 1961, a structural test airframe had been completed and was subjected to extensive structural and functional tests in rigs designed and fabricated at Bangalore. On 4 October 1962, a second prototype (BR 463) joined the flight development programme and the two prototypes were extensively tested by Das and a team of three Air Force test pilots for aerodynamics & stability, engine protocol, armament, instrumentation, emergency procedures etc. It was a remarkable achievement for its era. India became only the 6th country to design and fly its own supersonic jet combat aircraft after USA, UK, USSR, France and Sweden.

SEARCH FOR A SUITABLE POWER PLANT

The design of the HF-24 had been based around the expected availability of the 3700 kgf (kilogram force) afterburning Bristol Siddeley (later Rolls Royce) Orpheus engine which the British planned to develop. An after burning turbo jet is one in which fuel is injected and exploded in the hot exhaust of the jet (behind the turbines) which still has some oxygen in it. The resultant combustion of pure vaporized fuel into a red hot efflux blasting rearwards at hundreds of metres per second results in a rocket like acceleration and very high power to weight ratios. Afterburners consume prodigious volumes of fuels and are usually used when high thrust is needed for a few minutes. Unfortunately, the British requirement for this power plant was discarded and the Indian Government in a short sighted decision declined to underwrite its continued development (to Rolls Royce) even though the budget was only £13 million not a large sum even by the standards of 1961. This decision was to bedevil the Marut programme permanently. The design team was forced to adopt the non-afterburning 2200 kgf Orpheus 703 which powered the Gnat as an interim solution. It was an utterly reliable engine but with inadequate power for the Marut. We evaluated the Soviet Tumansky RD-9F that powered the contemporary Mig-19. The Tumansky powerplant had a full thrust of 3750 kgf with afterburners and put it just right for the Marut. But for reasons I don’t fully understand the Tumansky engine was rejected on grounds of surging and limited MTBO (Mean Time Between Overhauls). Speaking in favour of the Tumansky RD9F it was a rugged engine, had great acceleration, was resistant to ingestion of dust, mud and ice and went on to power the Soviet Mig-19, Yak-25, the Chinese Shenyang J-6 & Nanchang Q-5. It is popular in Western literature to decry the old Soviet engines as having a lower MTBO. What is less understood is that between the two MTBO points this Soviet engine needed little care & maintenance. However, I don’t want to be harsh in judging those who took these decisions as I have not stood in their shoes.

The lack of an appropriate power plant meant the Marut could not fulfill its role as an interceptor though the scope of being a reasonable ground attack fighter-bomber was very possible. A lot of hard work by Kurt Tank and team, by HAL and by Suranjan Das who led the team of test pilots did help mature the Marut into a flyable aircraft. Despite IAF reluctance and unwillingness to understand that it was in its own interests to support a fledgling home industry the Government sensibly ordered 18 pre-production aircraft and 62 operational ones to arm 2 or 3 squadrons. In fairness to the IAF there is a long journey from an aircraft that flies to an aircraft that fights and does so consistently in adverse conditions. In 1963 the Marut development efforts had not traveled that distance and the IAF was justified in not being keen to take an immature product into operational squadrons. In fact it would be 1971 by the time most defects were ironed out.

AIRCRAFT DESIGN & FEATURES

Marut's wing was highly swept and thin and large - all three characteristics for an interceptor. The sweep and thickness together determine the planes ability to fly across the speed of sound - greater the sweep and thinner the wing the lower is the thrust to weight ratio needed to get the aircraft supersonic. However, on the flip side, the greater the sweep and thinner the wing the higher becomes the landing speed and the less stable and maneuverable is the aircraft at low speeds below 250 knots (450 kmph). The Marut wing is a well balanced compromise of adequate sweep to get supersonic (provided the engines develop the thrust) and the thickness was enough to maintain moderate landing speeds and low speed stability. The wing bestowed on the HF-24 an acceleration and low altitude speed that the Pakistani Sabres and Indian Hawker Hunters could not match. In fact the Marut was one of the few, if not the only, frontline aircraft that could cross Mach 1.0 without afterburners - albeit just about at high altitudes.

The wings were designed to carry 4 pylons (or hardpoints) rated at 454 kgs each (1000 lbs). In addition each wing carried about 700 litres of fuel in the integral tanks. An integral tank means the internal space within the wing is sealed up and filled with fuel floating between the structural members. This means each wing carried a payload of about 1425 kgs of fuel and weapons. Think of it as carrying four Maruti 800s, two under each wing and clipping away at 550 knots (~1000 kmph).

TECHNICAL DETAILS:

General
Crew: 1 in the fighter-bomber; 2 in the conversion trainer
Length: 52' 1"
Wingspan: 29' 6"
Height: 11' 10"
Wing Area: 301 square feet (~28 sq metres)
Wing Sweep: Approximately 52 degrees 

Weights
Empty equipped: 6195 kgs/13,658 lbs
Loaded Clean: 8951 kgs/19,734 lbs
Fully Loaded: 10925 kgs/ 24,085 lbs

Power Plant 
Type: Two 2200 kgp (4850 lbs) Rolls Royce Orpheus 703 turbojets
Size & Weight: These were a variant of the Gnat powerplant. Small & compact at 75" length and 32" diameter. Weight = 379 kgs Power to Weight ratio of 5.9 kgp/kg of weight. 
Fuel Consumption: Specific fuel consumption for the Orpheus is 1080 grammes/kgp/hour. At full thrust for the Marut this translates to 106 litres per minute flying at 600 knots in clean condition … 175 metres per litre … this is just a rough calculation to tickle the petrolhead in all of us.

Performance 
Maximum Speed: 1112 kmph / 600 knots* or Mach 0.91** at sea level; 1086 kmph/ 586knots or Mach 1.02 at altitude 
* a knot = 1 nautical mile per hour i.e. 1.852 kmph; a nautical mile equals 1 minute of arc of any meridian of the earth
** Mach 1.0 is the speed of sound at a given altitude; Mach 2.0 by inference is twice the speed of sound. At sea level Mach 1.0 = ~1225 kmph; at 36,000 feet altitude it is ~ 1054 kmph.
Stall Speed: 248 kmph / 133 knots
Initial climb rate: 6000 feet/min or 30 metres/second at sea level
Range/Radius: 396 kms / 214 nm lo-lo-lo with a 1800 kgs warload 

lo-lo-lo is the typical fighter-bomber flight configuration it means ingress, attack and egress are all at low altitudes typically below 500 feet or 1000 feet, depending on terrain, to avoid radar detection; similarly you can have configurations such as lo-lo-hi or hi-lo-hi. Ferry flights by nature will be hi-hi-hi to get the best fuel economy

Wing Loading: ~66 lbs/ square foot in clean loaded condition; 80 lbs/ square foot at maximum weight. 
The first figure is one factor on its ability to dog fight out of enemy territory after releasing its warload on target. 66 is a lightly loaded wing supporting maneuverability. Corresponding figures for the Gnat are 57 lbs/ square foot and that for the very capable modern F-16 is 88. 

The latter figure of 80 indicates how well the wing will take to heavily loaded low level attack. Here we need a highly loaded wing to reduce the gust response (or bone jarring bumps) the aircraft encounters when flying at 550 knots below 1000'. Here The HF-24 doesn't do so well. Classic lo-lo-lo attack aircraft like the Sepecat Jaguar have wing loadings as high as 130 lbs/square foot

You can design a wing for interception - large, triangular, low loading, highly swept, thin or for low level attack - small, long chord (length at the root), high wing loading, moderate sweep to enhance lift and low speed control and thicker for aerodynamics and greater fuel.

Power Loading: 0.50 at clean weights; 0.41 at full weight 

These were moderate power loadings even for the 1960s. It reflected the unsuccessful hunt for the right engine or given the engine you had asking too much in the Air Staff Requirement. Normally for the 1960s the desired power loading in clean condition, for an interceptor, would have been 0.60 to 0.70 compared to Marut's much weaker 0.50. On the other hand in that era a dedicated ground attack aircraft (such as the McDonnell Douglas A4 Skyhawk) would have a maximum power to weight loading of 0.33 to 0.45. Here Marut's 0.41 ratio was in the right spot.

Service Ceiling: ~ 45,000'; as it was primarily used as a ground attack aircraft in combat it would usually fly at low altitudes below 1000' to avoid detection by radar.

Armament
Four 30mm Aden cannons with 130 rounds per gun; combined rate of fire 2400 rounds per minute ie 40 rounds per second. Some reports talk of blanking out two guns to reduce vibrations while firing. This was an issue in the 1960s and even cost the life of one test pilot. I don’t know if this was a temporary problem or a permanent issue.
4 underwing pylons rated for 1000 lbs /454 kgs each; typical loads were bombs of 1000lbs, 500 lbs & 250 lbs, 68mm SNEB rocket packs typically of 18 or 36 rockets per pack & napalm bombs. Not known if the HF-24 was configured for cluster munitions such as Hunting BL755 which was (and is) in common use by the IAF 
50 French SNEB 68mm ground attack rockets in internal pack behind pilot; The French rocket is used even today and is the world's most widely produced unguided rocket armament. The rockets can be fired in ripples with a spacing of 0.33 milliseconds. Typical warheads, amongst several variants, were high explosive, fragmentation & anti-tank. By possessing an internal weapons bay the HF-24 could carry these 50 SNEB rockets without their carriage inducing drag. This gave it greater flexibility in how the 4 pylons would be used to carry fuel or weapons for greater payload on target or a greater range for a given payload. 

SQUADRON SERVICE

HAL & IAF conducted 1800 test flights, between 1962 and 1967, to iron out the defects of the Marut. In April 1967 No.10 Flying Daggers Squadron became the first unit to be equipped with India's first indigenous combat aircraft. Close liaison between the IAF and the Hindustan Aircraft (as HAL was then named as) continued to progressively modify the Marut for the lo-lo-lo attack role.

During the early years Maruts with the IAF suffered from the non-availability of spares which in turn adversely affected serviceability. These chronic shortages affected the Marut fleet between 1965 and 1968, however as production picked up the situation improved markedly. But the aircraft had teething troubles that were not solved until 1970, and only a very meticulous reporting of problems and the professionalism of the pilots and engineers, prevented any fatalities from occurring.

There is wide consensus about excellent handling characteristics of the aircraft. Most pilots who have flown the aircraft describe it as pleasant to fly and excellent for aerobatics with fine control responses. And its ability to out-accelerate the Sabre jet, especially at low levels, was a useful asset in 1971. The Marut offered a stable weapon delivery platform and packed a formidable punch. While the Marut's pilots expressed an understandable desire for more thrust than the Orpheus 703 offered, they were unanimous in their view that the aircraft proved itself a thoroughly competent vehicle for the low-level ground attack profile. One defect which, I believe, remained was malfunction of roll control aerodynamic surfaces and the canopy flying off when all four 30mm cannons were fired simultaneously and the impact the recoil had on the electrics of the aircraft. HAL, I believe, claimed to have cured the problem but the IAF decided to be safe and blanked off the two upper cannons and operating only with the lower two in squadron service. The Marut was a robust aircraft with extremely good visibility for the pilot, and was aerodynamically one of the cleanest fighters of its time. 

The Marut eventually equipped three IAF Squadrons. No.10 Squadron was the first to convert in April 1967, the No.220 the Desert Tigers converted in May 1969 and the No.31 The Lions in March 1974. Of the 145 Maruts produced, 130+ entered squadron service the rest were used for testing & development

PERFORMANCE IN COMBAT

Both Squadrons mounted on the HF-24 operated from Jodhpur in December 1971 and served exclusively in attacking enemy ground targets such as fuel dumps, lines of supply, communication nodes, Pakistani airfields, railway junctions, armoured vehicles and troop concentrations. The HF-24 also took part in the battle of Longewala providing support to the 4 Hunters from Jaisalmer, that led the Indian offensive, by attacking the supply lines to the Pakistani tank brigade. About 100 enemy tanks were destroyed or damaged and their bid to attack Jaisalmer was subverted. 

The Marut's flew approximately 200 combat sorties during the two week war. On one strike mission they flew 200 nautical miles (~370 kms) into enemy territory to deliver their goods. The Marut also demonstrated that when flown clean it could tackle a Sabre jet. A Marut flown by Squadron Leader KK Bakshi of 220 Squadron also shot down a PAF F-86 Sabre on 7th December 1971 (Flying Officer Hamid Khwaja of 15 Squadron PAF). No aircraft were lost to air action although by the end of the war three Maruts had been lost to ground fire and one lost on the ground.

Maruts constantly found themselves under heavy and concentrated fire from the ground during their low-level attack missions. On at least three occasions, Maruts regained their base after one engine had been lost to ground fire. On one of these, a Marut returned to base without escort on one engine, from about 240 kms inside hostile territory. Another safety factor was the automatic reversion to manual control in the event of a failure in the hydraulic flying control system, and there were several instances of Maruts being flown back from a sortie manually. Throughout the December 1971 hostilities, the Marut squadrons enjoyed extremely high serviceability rates (in contrast to the late 1960s), this undoubtedly owed much to an improved spares situation and the original design's emphasis on ease of maintenance.

CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT

Dr. Kurt Tank and his team returned back to Germany in 1967 and the leadership for developing the Marut further passed onto Group Captain Suranjan Das who also served as the Chief Test Pilot. The Indian team at HAL successfully developed a two seat conversion trainer which moved into squadron service as the HF-24 T Mark 1. A prototype with an Indian developed experimental after burning Orpheus engine designated Mark 1R was lost while being test flown by Group Captain Suranjan Das. His death and challenges with the afterburner led to the demise of this line of development.

A PRE-MATURE END

The Marut served on in the IAF through the 1970s. The IAF developed two Air Staff Requirements namely the Deep Strike Penetration Aircraft (DPSA) and the shorter range Tactical Attack & Strike Aircraft (TASA). The IAF was not interested in waiting for HAL or DRDO to develop the Marut further to meet either of these requirements although with the right effort and sans the bureaucracy the TASA requirement could have been met by a Marut powered by the Rolls Royce Adour that powered the Sepecat Jaguar. The IAF went on to select two very fine aircraft to meet these requirements - the Sepecat Jaguar for the DPSA and the Mig-23BN followed by the Mig-27M for the TASA. Unlike the Indian Navy and the Chinese Air Force who both supported their home industry with orders for step by step improvements the IAF chose not to do this. Speaking in favour of the IAF - those days the Indo-Soviet friendship was at its peak and the Soviets were offering license production for the Mig-27M, a superb tactical attack aircraft, with Rupee trade payments and the IAF must have felt this was a better alternative than to spend yet several more years dealing with HAL's development journey. Maybe HAL was not to blame. Maybe the early demise of the Marut was sown in the overly ambitious specifications laid out in 1956-57. The last Marut was withdrawn in 1990. Today one can only wonder what could have been possible if HAL and other development agencies like DRDO had the focus and competence of ISRO and the IAF had a long term view like the Indian Navy which working with Mazagon Docks & Cochin Shipyard has built up some meaningful indigenous capability in design and construction after having started in the early 1960s same as the HF-24. To develop a nations aviation industry you have to think in terms of a 50 year horizon and go step by step. 

THE PATH AHEAD

In mid-1980s the ASR was laid out for the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft. Once again it was an ambitious set of specifications calling for capabilities and technology such as fly by wire flight control systems, multi-mode pulse doppler radar and an afterburning turbofan engine in the 10,000 kgf class. These were technological assets which only the Americans (F-16 & F-15) had successfully put into service at that time, the French were about to (Mirage 2000) and the Soviets were still developing. Partly due to, once again, putting out highly stretched specifications and partly the bureaucratic approach of the agencies involved the Tejas took three decades to develop, has just been inducted into the IAF for operational breaking-in and is still maybe a year short of full scale operational service. The more things change the more they stay the same. 

The current generation of engineers & designers working on the Tejas cannot be blamed for woolly headed thinking of 33 years ago. We should cheer them and support them as they work to put the country's second indigenous fast combat aircraft into full operational service this year. Aerodynamically speaking the Tejas is a superb design and this time around with the adoption of the General Electric F404 afterburning turbofan we also have a winner of an engine.

Wednesday, 13 May 2015

Indian New Defence Acquisitions Insights

New defence acquisitions insights
New defence acquisitions insights

The government is likely to pave the way for six new BrahMos supersonic cruise missile systems for the Indian Navy worth about Rs 2,700 crore besides taking a call on Army's proposal for acquiring BAE's M777 Ultra-Light Howitzers, in the Defence Acquisition Council meeting on Wednesday.

Defence sources said the issue of the US $2.5 billion Avro replacement programme is also likely to be discussed.

Besides the Avro, the big ticket proposal for Wednesday is six new BrahMos systems with 89 supersonic missiles. The cost of the project will be around Rs 2,700 crore, sources told PTI.

Another important proposal to be discussed is BAE Systems' offer to build a howitzer factory in India to close a deal valued at nearly US $800 million.

It was first considered by the UPA regime but underwent a quiet burial due to differences over price and offset commitments.

However, keen to sell its guns to India, the American company has offered to be part of the 'Make in India' initiative, sources said, adding that the firm is ready to set up an assembly line here with a local partner to make the guns domestically.

The sources said it would be a government to government deal between US and India.

The Army, which is in desperate need of new artillery guns, is keen that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) option be revived for BAE's guns and that a fresh Letter of Offer and Acceptance be floated to US.

Another key proposal that would come under discussion is the lone bid of Airbus-TATA consortium to replace IAF's ageing fleet of 56 Avro aircraft with C-295 transport carriers.

A final decision was anticipated in November last year but Parrikar had then sought more information about the necessity of the aircraft and the bidding process. Under the current defence procurement policy, single-vendor situation is not entertained unless cleared by the DAC.

Sunday, 10 May 2015

World War II special: Did you know the Chinese Army once trained in India?

Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell inspecting Chinese troops Ramgarh
Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell inspecting Chinese troops Ramgarh

When the going got tough, Stilwell pulled back the troops into British India with the intention of training them.

It might now seem unthinkable, but there was a time when the Chinese Army actually trained on Indian soil, “somewhere in the north east”.

With Japan conquering most of China, United States and Nationalist China came together to fight the Axis power. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was the Allied Supreme Commander in the China Theater and he accepted President Roosevelt’s nominee Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell chief of staff of the combined forces.

But when the going got tough, Stilwell pulled back the troops into British India with the intention of training them.

In fact, as many as 20 Chinese divisions were trained in the US-run base of Ramgarh, now in Jharkhand, for a special campaign in Burma.

The following videos show Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell in Ramgarh. 

Friday, 8 May 2015

Indian Ocean - The 21st Century security dilemma between China and India

Great power competition in the Indian Ocean
Great power competition in the Indian Ocean

Indian Ocean is where global struggles will play out in the twenty-first century. It is a “new great game” in the making.

Indian Ocean is the new theatre of ‘Great Power’ politics of the twenty-first century. With a tactical geopolitical landscape, the Indian Ocean- third largest waterway in the world surpassing the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as the world’s largest and most strategically significant maritime trade for global economy and security. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is surrounded by Africa, Asia and Australia serves as a maritime highway linking transcontinental human and economic relationships. In this context, the strategic importance of Indian Ocean can be best assessed in the prophetic words of maritime strategist Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, who famously stated: “Whoever attains maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean would be a prominent player on the international scene. Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This Ocean is the key to the seven seas in the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters.”

It is these prophetic words that forms the new pivot to the changing strategic dynamics in the Indian Ocean which Robert D. Kaplan envisaged as the ‘Centre Stage for the 21st Century’ whereby in the spiralling rivalry of a rising China and India, ‘Indian Ocean is where global struggles will play out in the twenty-first century’- a “new great game” in the making. With a gradual decline in U.S. dominance, the power struggle seem to have taken its initial roots, whereby both China and India are looking the “Mahanian way” in redirecting their gaze from the continent to the seas. In this view, the Indian Ocean is the new limit to China-India’s complex power politics- where both are determined to make it their nautical backyard. This strategic objective has added a maritime dimension to their geopolitical rivalry.

Indian Ocean: The Centre of Claim

Since the Indian Ocean has become the pivotal region in the economic and geopolitical configuration between the two rising Asian giants, thereby, making it the new security dilemma between the two competitors. This dilemma is created by the ‘defensive moves’ taken by one which is seen to reduce the security of the other.  Keeping this context, thereby, to understand the spiralling of tensions, it becomes imperative to assess the stakes that are involved for the two global actors. What makes Indian Ocean a duel ground between China and India is the fact that it is ‘home to important SLCOs (Sea Lanes of Communications) and maritime choke points’ such as the Straits of Hormuz, Babel-Mandeb Strait, Straits of Malacca, Lombok and the Sunda Straits- which form the vital routes for trade and energy (oil and gas) supplies. Together these carry over 50 per cent of the world’s container traffic and over 80 per cent of the world’s seaborne oil trade travels through this maritime corridor of the Indian Ocean. In this case, any disruption to the sea lines calls for severe security implications for the littoral states, which hinders their economic development. Thereby, to avoid any inherent risks of energy imports and transport bottlenecks, both China and India have adopted strategies such as- pursuing equity stakes in overseas upstream energy projects, building overland or underwater pipelines, investing in pariah states such as Iran, Myanmar, Sudan and others and by establishing Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPRs).

In this view, the strategic interest of both China and India to play an active and dominant role in the Indian Ocean is mainly driven by two factors. First is to procure and secure energy. The sudden rise of India and China as global economic powers has significantly increased their energy needs and their dependence on the Gulf for oil supplies. Since both China and India are heavy energy importers, Indian Ocean acts as the key route for international trade and energy (oil and gas) imports through the sea lanes. For China, 80 per cent of petroleum imports pass through the Indian Ocean into the Straits of Malacca, and for India, 75 per cent of its oil imports originates from the Persian Gulf and passes through the Straits of Hormuz. In this wrestle for energy security, Beijing’s ‘Malacca dilemma’ is matched with New Delhi’s ‘Hormuz Dilemma’. Thus, this quest for energy security has heightened the direct stakes of both the rising powers in maintaining the security and stability of the Indian Ocean region.

Secondly, the ambition for great power status in the Indian Ocean, in order to become a dominant player to project power and gain freedom of navigation in the crucial waters of the Indian Ocean. In this case, India’s dominant position in the Indian Ocean by virtue of its geographic location and, given its potential to be a great power together with its aspirations runs antagonistic to a rising China’s quest to gain strategic and hegemonic space in an off-shore region. In this great power rivalry, both India and China are engaged in the game of balancing and counter-balancing by means of engaging with each other’s peripheries. Both the powers are pursuing a policy of creating its own web of relationships with the littoral states both bilaterally and multilaterally-by investing in their economies, building ports and infrastructure, providing weaponry, and acquiring energy resources. For example, India is engaging through the ‘Look East Policy’- by economic and strategic engagement with mostly Myanmar, Vietnam and ASEAN. While China is building its ties through the ‘String of Pearls’, an ‘encirclement strategy’-of which Myanmar, Pakistan and SAARC are seen to be the most important platforms of exercising China’s Indian Ocean policy.

Increasing Military Muscle

With these motivations, both China and India are involved in flexing their military muscle in the Indian Ocean, which is reflective of their unequivocal desire to improve their ability to combat any kind of perceived threat to their critical sea lanes- which directly pose a challenge to their economic development. Therefore, China and India’s share a common national security strategy which aims to forge a link to the Indian Ocean in order to have an unimpeded market access, more direct energy supply lines, and the option of bypassing the dangerous bottlenecks at the sea lanes. To achieve this national interest, both the countries have adopted various strategic Indian Ocean policies.

In this view, China’s footprints in the Indian Ocean are visible in its surging naval activities by both and soft power tactics to increase its influence. Of which, the most recent activity (January 2014), is observed in the forays of the PLA Navy through the Lombok Strait near Indonesia into the Western Pacific- a navy drill conducted by a three-ship Chinese navy squadron, where the largest amphibious Chinese landing ship – Changbaishan - along with two destroyers -Wuhan and Haikou. This military activity of China is seen as its expansion into the waters in the eastern Indian Ocean, with an ability to operate in the off-shores bases. Chinese Navy’s field activities also include its participation in the joint anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia in 2011 and its ship to ship replenishment exercise in Eastern Indian Ocean in December 2013. While China has deployed three Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in active service as of 2007 and is also reported of deploying attack submarines. China has built naval outposts and China-friendly ports, such as- Sittwe and Coco Island in Myanmar, to Gwadar in Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and in Seychelles. Besides these strategic policies, Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 have proposed to build a ‘Maritime Silk Road’ to boost maritime connectivity with Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean.

Similarly, India is expanding its established maritime presence through developing its own network of bases, such as, the Indian naval station, INS Baaz, at the mouth of the Malacca Strait and an envisaged Chabahar port in Iran, which is situated adjacent to the Hormuz Strait. Apart from this, India has also stealthily spanned its interests in the Indian Ocean Rim- connecting with the islands of Mauritius, Maldives, Seychelles and Madagascar and the rim states of South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique. India has also beefed up its naval presence by positioning INS Chakra, a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) leased from Russia in active service and the Arihant-class SSBN,a nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine  in the Indian Ocean.And most importantly, the launch of India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier Vikrant in 2013 is seen as India’s “ambition to dominate the Indian Ocean” and heralding a greater Indian presence in the Pacific. India’s naval activities are reflective in its multilateral naval exercises (MILAN) with Indian Ocean states such as the Seychelles, Mauritius and the Maldives, along with bilateral naval exercises with Myanmar and Sri Lanka. India has invested some US$5 million for defence-related projects in the Seychelles, and has installed radar surveillance in the atolls of the Maldives.

In an overall assessment, it can thus, be rightly stated that China and India, with their competitive aspirations are going to shape the contours of twenty-first century global politics which is to be played in the Indian Ocean. Here, the new security dilemma between the two rising Asian powers is based on championing the sea power capabilities in order to control the Indian Ocean which is destined to decide the fate of Asia. Therefore, both China and India are looking the ‘Mahanian way’ in the Indian Ocean- the new ‘great game’ of the twenty-first century.

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