INS Vikrant undocking postponed to Monday

INS Vikrant in dock

Siltation and a minor technical glitch in lowering the building bay dock gate, which was last operated when the maiden indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was taken in post-launch for the second phase of work a year-and-a-half ago, have forced the Cochin Shipyard to defer the undocking of the carrier to Monday.

The aircraft carrier was to have been undocked on completion of structural work on Saturday.
Flooding of the dock and ballasting of the carrier, weighing about 26,000 tonnes minus the ballast, had begun on Friday.

However, unfavourable tide and a bit of siltation at the dock mouth besides a minor glitch with the dock gate forced the undocking to be put off. Sources said the carrier would continue to be outfitted for over a year-and-a-half after undocking when the second phase of construction would draw to a close. The yard considers this to be the most challenging phase during which cabling, piping, accommodation facility, air conditioning and ventilation systems would be done.

Once complete, the carrier will have some 2,300 compartments.

IAF legend Jumbo Majumdar’s medals set for return to India

Wing Commander Karun Krishna 'Jumbo' Majumdar

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has purchased the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) and Bar awarded to Wing Commander Karun Krishna 'Jumbo' Majumdar from a London auction house.

Majumdar, widely referred to as the 'Father of the IAF', was born in Kolkata in 1913. Grandson of W C Bonnerjee, the first president of Indian National Congress, Majumdar was commissioned to No. 1 Squadron in the mid-1930s. Upon his promotion as squadron leader, he took over its reins in June 1941 at Miranshah, NWFP (now in Pakistan).

From there, the squadron was posted to the Toungoo airfield in Burma. The Japanese attacked the next day and destroyed a number of Allied installations and aircraft, but Majumdar's squadron remained unscathed. Jumbo immediately planned a retaliatory attack on Mae-Haungsan, from where the Japanese had taken off.

At the time, the Lysander had never been used for bombing. "The next day, when Majumdar took off in a solitary Lysander armed with two 250-lb bombs, the New Zealanders in the No.67 RAF Squadron who shared Toungoo, sent an escort of two Buffalo fighters in sheer admiration for the young Indian. He flew at a low level, almost skimming tree tops, to achieve complete surprise and dropped the bombs on a hangar, destroying it along with the aircraft inside," a senior officer said.

"The next day, Majumdar led his whole squadron in to bomb the airfield, destroying buildings, wireless stations and aircraft on the ground," the officer added. "Majumdar was awarded the DFC for his leadership of the squadron during the Burma Campaign, becoming the first Indian officer to be decorated with this award in World War II," the officer said.

Jumbo then served in Europe and received his Bar to the DFC for this service in January 1945. On February 17, 1945, Wing Commander Jumbo Majumdar was killed during an aerobatic sortie in a Hawker Hurricane.

"His DFC and Bar and other decorations were passed on to his son and subsequently sold to an auction house in London. After we came to know of this, efforts were made to purchase them. Retired IAF officer Air Marshal Anil Chopra also offered to spend his pension funds to get the medals back.

Finally, the IAF intervened and bought the decorations, barely a few days before they were to go under the hammer. They will be brought back to India and displayed at the Air Force Museum," the officer added.

Army to get 114 Dhanush by 3 years

Dhanush during trials

The Army’s quest for new artillery is nearing completion with the indigenous gun upgraded by the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) clearing trials. The Army has placed an indent for 114 guns in the first phase and these will be delivered in three years, informed sources said.

“After the Pokhran fiasco with one barrel-burst, Dhanush barrels were tested in Sikkim under cold conditions and in other temperatures - and came out with flying colours. The Army is fully satisfied,” informed the officials.

A Dhanush prototype suffered a barrel burst during firing trials at Pokhran in August 2013 which delayed the process.

The initial deal for 114 guns is expected to cost around Rs.1,600 crore. Pleased with the performance of the gun, the Army has given strong indications of an additional order for 481 guns, sources added.

The Dhanush is an upgraded version of the Swedish 155-mm Bofors howitzers bought by India in the mid-1980s based on the original design. It is a 155-mm, 45-calibre gun with a maximum effective range of 38 km in salvo mode compared to the 39-calibre, 27-km range of the original guns. It is 80 per cent indigenous, with the APU (auxiliary power unit), electronic dial sights and a few other small items being imported.

The Army is desperately short of new long-range artillery, having failed to induct any new gun after the Bofors scandal. Recently, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) headed by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar approved a revised proposal from BAE Systems for 145 Ultra-Light Howitzers for mountainous areas under a government-to-government deal with the United States.

Additionally last November, the DAC cleared the process for purchase of 814 mounted gun systems through the ‘Buy and Make’ category to be built by an Indian private partner in collaboration with a foreign manufacturer.

HF-24 Marut, first Indian designed jet fighter

HAL HF 24 Marut

This is the story of India's first indigenously designed jet fighter the HF-24 Marut. It was a landmark achievement for the 1950s and 60s and I don’t wish to take anything away from that. Nevertheless this tale is narrated with what I hope is a balanced objectivity and not a nostalgic applaud. I have tried to balance between things we can be proud of, things we didn't do so well and lessons we ought to have learnt but may not have.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

India, in 1955, was a young nation full of enthusiasm for building the economy. A lot of projects were tried for the first time under the national objective of creating our own manufacturing and design capabilities. One such endeavour was to design and build in India, for the first time, our very own jet fighter. This was ambitious to say the least at a time when we had just started assembling diesel locomotives, had never built a major ship, had just started assembly of motor cars, possessed little aluminum smelting capacity etc etc. This was Pandit Nehru's vision and the IAF (Indian Air Force) enthusiastically went along. At the time of the Marut's conception, the domestic aviation industry's only design experience amounted to designing and manufacturing the HT-2, a piston engine propeller driven trainer. Whatever aircraft manufacturing capability existed resulted from the license assembly of the Vampire Fighter Bomber FBMk.52 and Trainer TMk.55. To have considered building a supersonic capable aircraft, given such limited capabilities, bordered on audacity. The only aircraft manufacturing capability lay in Hindustan Aircraft Ltd (HAL) set up by Walchand Hirachand in the 1930s and nationalized by the Government subsequently.

The HT-2 propeller driven primary trainer, this represented the only indigenous design capability in India at the time of the decision to design & build the Marut. The HT-2 was designed by Dr VM Ghatge and served the IAF and the Army Aviation Corps for 25 years. 172 were manufactured of which 12 were exported to Ghana. 

The building of the Marut (Spirit of the Tempest), as this aircraft was to be called, was the first attempt of its kind anywhere outside the four major powers of USA, USSR, UK and France to build a supersonic jet fighter. Whatever else one might say the gumption deserves admiration. The political, bureaucratic and I dare say military hierarchies did not have a proper appreciation of the supply chain infrastructure and quality control challenges that would need to be overcome.

AIR STAFF REQUIREMENT

The Marut was conceived to meet an Air Staff Requirement (ASR), that called for a multi-role aircraft suitable for both high-altitude interception and low-level ground attack. The specified performance attributes called for a speed of Mach 2.0 at altitude, a ceiling of 60,000 feet (18,290 m) and a combat radius of 500 miles (805 km). Furthermore, the Air Staff Requirement demanded that the basic design be suitable for adaptation as an advanced trainer, an all-weather fighter and for 'navalization' as a shipboard aircraft. It was directed that this aircraft be developed within the country. Nations with advanced military design and manufacturing capabilities rarely, if ever, put out specifications that are such all singing all dancing renditions. A military aircraft is designed to play one role well, a second role moderately well and sometimes , only sometimes, a third role in a limited form. Unfortunately out of lack of experience (and in my opinion a willingness to apply common sense) the Air Staff Requirement was too wide and reflected lack of clarity of aims and a complete lack of understanding of what it takes to design and build a fighter as opposed to flying one. It is like saying - I want a car that drives like a BMW 3 (Mach 2.0), suitable for both high and low altitudes (drive well on a race track as well on Delhi's rutted roads), can carry payload like a Isuzu D-Max pick-up (low level ground attack payload) and have the toughness of a 4-wheel drive cross country mud slogger (capable of all weather capabilities & navalization). The combat radius of ~800 kms was beyond the ken of the most efficient fighter turbojet even in the USA of the 1950s. These ranges were not achieved till military turbofan engines like the Rolls Royce Spey (on the Hawker Buccaneer, 1960s) or Rolls Royce Adour (Sepecat Jaguar, 1970s) amongst others came into play. All weather was at best in an experimental rudimentary stage even in USA and USSR in 1956 and no IAF aircraft of 1956 even carried a gun ranging radar let alone a search & track one. While I don’t wish to be too critical these were overly ambitious specifications for 1955 even for the UK, France or USSR. As an aside, it might be worth noting that the ASR for the current Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas, in mid-1980s, followed the same concept of all singing all dancing and (partly due to that) it is sadly still some way off from full operational service 30 years later. The only other aircraft of the 1950s and 1960s that was designed to similar specifications as the Marut and carried a requirement for navalization + all-weather was the legendary McDonnell Douglas F4 Phantom of the US Air Force and Navy. And let's remember the Americans were then and today the foremost in aviation R&D, design and production know-how. And even with the Phantom the Americans lost out on maneuverability.

Dr VM Ghatge, India's senior most aeronautical designer was the only voice against the Marut. He prescribed a more balanced step by step approach to building the nation's aviation industry by first designing & building propeller trainers, then basic jet trainers, then light attack fighter-bombers and then a more advanced light multi-role fighter and to do this in stages over 2 decades. In retrospect his was, in my opinion, the more sensible approach. But Ghatge's voice was drowned out.

Nehru tried to attract leading aeronautical designers from the west to work for India on this project. It was to his credit that he convinced Dr. Kurt Tank (of Focke Wulf fame) to take up this assignment along with his able deputy Engineer Mittelhuber. Both arrived in Bangalore in August 1956. As head of the design team it was Kurt Tank who would give the design shape and substance. 

HAL in 1956, possessed only three senior Indian design engineers and the entire design department boasted only 54 personnel. It had no hangar space for construction of prototypes, no machine shop for prototype engineering, no suitable test equipment, structural test rigs or a flight test laboratory. In fact even the runway length was inadequate for a jet fighter prototype. It is to the credit of HAL team of that era that all this was created from scratch while Kurt Tank built up the design & prototype team of over 850 personnel including 18 German designers. 

DESIGNING & BUILDING THE MARUT

A full scale representation (wooden glider) of the projected fighter was ready by early 1959. A test program was initiated with this glider on 1 April 1959. The new design was given the designation of Hindustan Fighter 24 or simply HF-24.

Glider tests for aerodynamics started in April 1959. 78 test flights were conducted with the gliders which were released between 12,000 and 15,000 feet altitude. Use of wooden gliders was an integral part of Kurt Tank's style of design testing.

Assembly of the first HF-24 prototype (HF-001) began in April 1960 and after a comprehensive three month ground test programme, HF-001 (later re-numbered BR 462), with the late Wing Commander (later Group Captain) Suranjan Das at the controls, flew for the first time on 17 June 1961. In the circumstances this was a commendably short period of 15 months from starting to put together the prototype to first flight. 

HF-001, the first prototype was first subjected to several days of ground run testing to check if at a basic level the controls, engines, fuel systems, hydraulics, electrics actually work in co-ordination. 

Wing Commander (later group Captain) Suranjan Das, India's foremost test pilot, flew the HF-001 for the first time on 17th June, 1961. He led the test flying on the Marut as well as the later Kiran jet trainer. Earlier he had led the test flying for the Gnat. Tragically, he was killed in 1970 when testing a more advanced version of the Marut.

On 27th June 1961 they built up enough confidence and test hours to show case the prototype to Prime Minister Nehru. The prototype was re-numbered BR462. By November 1961, a structural test airframe had been completed and was subjected to extensive structural and functional tests in rigs designed and fabricated at Bangalore. On 4 October 1962, a second prototype (BR 463) joined the flight development programme and the two prototypes were extensively tested by Das and a team of three Air Force test pilots for aerodynamics & stability, engine protocol, armament, instrumentation, emergency procedures etc. It was a remarkable achievement for its era. India became only the 6th country to design and fly its own supersonic jet combat aircraft after USA, UK, USSR, France and Sweden.

SEARCH FOR A SUITABLE POWER PLANT

The design of the HF-24 had been based around the expected availability of the 3700 kgf (kilogram force) afterburning Bristol Siddeley (later Rolls Royce) Orpheus engine which the British planned to develop. An after burning turbo jet is one in which fuel is injected and exploded in the hot exhaust of the jet (behind the turbines) which still has some oxygen in it. The resultant combustion of pure vaporized fuel into a red hot efflux blasting rearwards at hundreds of metres per second results in a rocket like acceleration and very high power to weight ratios. Afterburners consume prodigious volumes of fuels and are usually used when high thrust is needed for a few minutes. Unfortunately, the British requirement for this power plant was discarded and the Indian Government in a short sighted decision declined to underwrite its continued development (to Rolls Royce) even though the budget was only £13 million not a large sum even by the standards of 1961. This decision was to bedevil the Marut programme permanently. The design team was forced to adopt the non-afterburning 2200 kgf Orpheus 703 which powered the Gnat as an interim solution. It was an utterly reliable engine but with inadequate power for the Marut. We evaluated the Soviet Tumansky RD-9F that powered the contemporary Mig-19. The Tumansky powerplant had a full thrust of 3750 kgf with afterburners and put it just right for the Marut. But for reasons I don’t fully understand the Tumansky engine was rejected on grounds of surging and limited MTBO (Mean Time Between Overhauls). Speaking in favour of the Tumansky RD9F it was a rugged engine, had great acceleration, was resistant to ingestion of dust, mud and ice and went on to power the Soviet Mig-19, Yak-25, the Chinese Shenyang J-6 & Nanchang Q-5. It is popular in Western literature to decry the old Soviet engines as having a lower MTBO. What is less understood is that between the two MTBO points this Soviet engine needed little care & maintenance. However, I don’t want to be harsh in judging those who took these decisions as I have not stood in their shoes.

The lack of an appropriate power plant meant the Marut could not fulfill its role as an interceptor though the scope of being a reasonable ground attack fighter-bomber was very possible. A lot of hard work by Kurt Tank and team, by HAL and by Suranjan Das who led the team of test pilots did help mature the Marut into a flyable aircraft. Despite IAF reluctance and unwillingness to understand that it was in its own interests to support a fledgling home industry the Government sensibly ordered 18 pre-production aircraft and 62 operational ones to arm 2 or 3 squadrons. In fairness to the IAF there is a long journey from an aircraft that flies to an aircraft that fights and does so consistently in adverse conditions. In 1963 the Marut development efforts had not traveled that distance and the IAF was justified in not being keen to take an immature product into operational squadrons. In fact it would be 1971 by the time most defects were ironed out.

AIRCRAFT DESIGN & FEATURES

Marut's wing was highly swept and thin and large - all three characteristics for an interceptor. The sweep and thickness together determine the planes ability to fly across the speed of sound - greater the sweep and thinner the wing the lower is the thrust to weight ratio needed to get the aircraft supersonic. However, on the flip side, the greater the sweep and thinner the wing the higher becomes the landing speed and the less stable and maneuverable is the aircraft at low speeds below 250 knots (450 kmph). The Marut wing is a well balanced compromise of adequate sweep to get supersonic (provided the engines develop the thrust) and the thickness was enough to maintain moderate landing speeds and low speed stability. The wing bestowed on the HF-24 an acceleration and low altitude speed that the Pakistani Sabres and Indian Hawker Hunters could not match. In fact the Marut was one of the few, if not the only, frontline aircraft that could cross Mach 1.0 without afterburners - albeit just about at high altitudes.

The wings were designed to carry 4 pylons (or hardpoints) rated at 454 kgs each (1000 lbs). In addition each wing carried about 700 litres of fuel in the integral tanks. An integral tank means the internal space within the wing is sealed up and filled with fuel floating between the structural members. This means each wing carried a payload of about 1425 kgs of fuel and weapons. Think of it as carrying four Maruti 800s, two under each wing and clipping away at 550 knots (~1000 kmph).

TECHNICAL DETAILS:

General
Crew: 1 in the fighter-bomber; 2 in the conversion trainer
Length: 52' 1"
Wingspan: 29' 6"
Height: 11' 10"
Wing Area: 301 square feet (~28 sq metres)
Wing Sweep: Approximately 52 degrees 

Weights
Empty equipped: 6195 kgs/13,658 lbs
Loaded Clean: 8951 kgs/19,734 lbs
Fully Loaded: 10925 kgs/ 24,085 lbs

Power Plant 
Type: Two 2200 kgp (4850 lbs) Rolls Royce Orpheus 703 turbojets
Size & Weight: These were a variant of the Gnat powerplant. Small & compact at 75" length and 32" diameter. Weight = 379 kgs Power to Weight ratio of 5.9 kgp/kg of weight. 
Fuel Consumption: Specific fuel consumption for the Orpheus is 1080 grammes/kgp/hour. At full thrust for the Marut this translates to 106 litres per minute flying at 600 knots in clean condition … 175 metres per litre … this is just a rough calculation to tickle the petrolhead in all of us.

Performance 
Maximum Speed: 1112 kmph / 600 knots* or Mach 0.91** at sea level; 1086 kmph/ 586knots or Mach 1.02 at altitude 
* a knot = 1 nautical mile per hour i.e. 1.852 kmph; a nautical mile equals 1 minute of arc of any meridian of the earth
** Mach 1.0 is the speed of sound at a given altitude; Mach 2.0 by inference is twice the speed of sound. At sea level Mach 1.0 = ~1225 kmph; at 36,000 feet altitude it is ~ 1054 kmph.
Stall Speed: 248 kmph / 133 knots
Initial climb rate: 6000 feet/min or 30 metres/second at sea level
Range/Radius: 396 kms / 214 nm lo-lo-lo with a 1800 kgs warload 

lo-lo-lo is the typical fighter-bomber flight configuration it means ingress, attack and egress are all at low altitudes typically below 500 feet or 1000 feet, depending on terrain, to avoid radar detection; similarly you can have configurations such as lo-lo-hi or hi-lo-hi. Ferry flights by nature will be hi-hi-hi to get the best fuel economy

Wing Loading: ~66 lbs/ square foot in clean loaded condition; 80 lbs/ square foot at maximum weight. 

The first figure is one factor on its ability to dog fight out of enemy territory after releasing its warload on target. 66 is a lightly loaded wing supporting maneuverability. Corresponding figures for the Gnat are 57 lbs/ square foot and that for the very capable modern F-16 is 88. 

The latter figure of 80 indicates how well the wing will take to heavily loaded low level attack. Here we need a highly loaded wing to reduce the gust response (or bone jarring bumps) the aircraft encounters when flying at 550 knots below 1000'. Here The HF-24 doesn't do so well. Classic lo-lo-lo attack aircraft like the Sepecat Jaguar have wing loadings as high as 130 lbs/square foot

You can design a wing for interception - large, triangular, low loading, highly swept, thin or for low level attack - small, long chord (length at the root), high wing loading, moderate sweep to enhance lift and low speed control and thicker for aerodynamics and greater fuel.

Power Loading: 0.50 at clean weights; 0.41 at full weight 

These were moderate power loadings even for the 1960s. It reflected the unsuccessful hunt for the right engine or given the engine you had asking too much in the Air Staff Requirement. Normally for the 1960s the desired power loading in clean condition, for an interceptor, would have been 0.60 to 0.70 compared to Marut's much weaker 0.50. On the other hand in that era a dedicated ground attack aircraft (such as the McDonnell Douglas A4 Skyhawk) would have a maximum power to weight loading of 0.33 to 0.45. Here Marut's 0.41 ratio was in the right spot.

Service Ceiling: ~ 45,000'; as it was primarily used as a ground attack aircraft in combat it would usually fly at low altitudes below 1000' to avoid detection by radar.

Armament

Four 30mm Aden cannons with 130 rounds per gun; combined rate of fire 2400 rounds per minute ie 40 rounds per second. Some reports talk of blanking out two guns to reduce vibrations while firing. This was an issue in the 1960s and even cost the life of one test pilot. I don’t know if this was a temporary problem or a permanent issue.

4 underwing pylons rated for 1000 lbs /454 kgs each; typical loads were bombs of 1000lbs, 500 lbs & 250 lbs, 68mm SNEB rocket packs typically of 18 or 36 rockets per pack & napalm bombs. Not known if the HF-24 was configured for cluster munitions such as Hunting BL755 which was (and is) in common use by the IAF 

50 French SNEB 68mm ground attack rockets in internal pack behind pilot; The French rocket is used even today and is the world's most widely produced unguided rocket armament. The rockets can be fired in ripples with a spacing of 0.33 milliseconds. Typical warheads, amongst several variants, were high explosive, fragmentation & anti-tank. By possessing an internal weapons bay the HF-24 could carry these 50 SNEB rockets without their carriage inducing drag. This gave it greater flexibility in how the 4 pylons would be used to carry fuel or weapons for greater payload on target or a greater range for a given payload. 

SQUADRON SERVICE

HAL & IAF conducted 1800 test flights, between 1962 and 1967, to iron out the defects of the Marut. In April 1967 No.10 Flying Daggers Squadron became the first unit to be equipped with India's first indigenous combat aircraft. Close liaison between the IAF and the Hindustan Aircraft (as HAL was then named as) continued to progressively modify the Marut for the lo-lo-lo attack role.

During the early years Maruts with the IAF suffered from the non-availability of spares which in turn adversely affected serviceability. These chronic shortages affected the Marut fleet between 1965 and 1968, however as production picked up the situation improved markedly. But the aircraft had teething troubles that were not solved until 1970, and only a very meticulous reporting of problems and the professionalism of the pilots and engineers, prevented any fatalities from occurring.

There is wide consensus about excellent handling characteristics of the aircraft. Most pilots who have flown the aircraft describe it as pleasant to fly and excellent for aerobatics with fine control responses. And its ability to out-accelerate the Sabre jet, especially at low levels, was a useful asset in 1971. The Marut offered a stable weapon delivery platform and packed a formidable punch. While the Marut's pilots expressed an understandable desire for more thrust than the Orpheus 703 offered, they were unanimous in their view that the aircraft proved itself a thoroughly competent vehicle for the low-level ground attack profile. One defect which, I believe, remained was malfunction of roll control aerodynamic surfaces and the canopy flying off when all four 30mm cannons were fired simultaneously and the impact the recoil had on the electrics of the aircraft. HAL, I believe, claimed to have cured the problem but the IAF decided to be safe and blanked off the two upper cannons and operating only with the lower two in squadron service. The Marut was a robust aircraft with extremely good visibility for the pilot, and was aerodynamically one of the cleanest fighters of its time. 

The Marut eventually equipped three IAF Squadrons. No.10 Squadron was the first to convert in April 1967, the No.220 the Desert Tigers converted in May 1969 and the No.31 The Lions in March 1974. Of the 145 Maruts produced, 130+ entered squadron service the rest were used for testing & development

PERFORMANCE IN COMBAT

Both Squadrons mounted on the HF-24 operated from Jodhpur in December 1971 and served exclusively in attacking enemy ground targets such as fuel dumps, lines of supply, communication nodes, Pakistani airfields, railway junctions, armoured vehicles and troop concentrations. The HF-24 also took part in the battle of Longewala providing support to the 4 Hunters from Jaisalmer, that led the Indian offensive, by attacking the supply lines to the Pakistani tank brigade. About 100 enemy tanks were destroyed or damaged and their bid to attack Jaisalmer was subverted. 

The Marut's flew approximately 200 combat sorties during the two week war. On one strike mission they flew 200 nautical miles (~370 kms) into enemy territory to deliver their goods. The Marut also demonstrated that when flown clean it could tackle a Sabre jet. A Marut flown by Squadron Leader KK Bakshi of 220 Squadron also shot down a PAF F-86 Sabre on 7th December 1971 (Flying Officer Hamid Khwaja of 15 Squadron PAF). No aircraft were lost to air action although by the end of the war three Maruts had been lost to ground fire and one lost on the ground.

Maruts constantly found themselves under heavy and concentrated fire from the ground during their low-level attack missions. On at least three occasions, Maruts regained their base after one engine had been lost to ground fire. On one of these, a Marut returned to base without escort on one engine, from about 240 kms inside hostile territory. Another safety factor was the automatic reversion to manual control in the event of a failure in the hydraulic flying control system, and there were several instances of Maruts being flown back from a sortie manually. Throughout the December 1971 hostilities, the Marut squadrons enjoyed extremely high serviceability rates (in contrast to the late 1960s), this undoubtedly owed much to an improved spares situation and the original design's emphasis on ease of maintenance.

CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT

Dr. Kurt Tank and his team returned back to Germany in 1967 and the leadership for developing the Marut further passed onto Group Captain Suranjan Das who also served as the Chief Test Pilot. The Indian team at HAL successfully developed a two seat conversion trainer which moved into squadron service as the HF-24 T Mark 1. A prototype with an Indian developed experimental after burning Orpheus engine designated Mark 1R was lost while being test flown by Group Captain Suranjan Das. His death and challenges with the afterburner led to the demise of this line of development.

A PRE-MATURE END

The Marut served on in the IAF through the 1970s. The IAF developed two Air Staff Requirements namely the Deep Strike Penetration Aircraft (DPSA) and the shorter range Tactical Attack & Strike Aircraft (TASA). The IAF was not interested in waiting for HAL or DRDO to develop the Marut further to meet either of these requirements although with the right effort and sans the bureaucracy the TASA requirement could have been met by a Marut powered by the Rolls Royce Adour that powered the Sepecat Jaguar. The IAF went on to select two very fine aircraft to meet these requirements - the Sepecat Jaguar for the DPSA and the Mig-23BN followed by the Mig-27M for the TASA. Unlike the Indian Navy and the Chinese Air Force who both supported their home industry with orders for step by step improvements the IAF chose not to do this. Speaking in favour of the IAF - those days the Indo-Soviet friendship was at its peak and the Soviets were offering license production for the Mig-27M, a superb tactical attack aircraft, with Rupee trade payments and the IAF must have felt this was a better alternative than to spend yet several more years dealing with HAL's development journey. Maybe HAL was not to blame. Maybe the early demise of the Marut was sown in the overly ambitious specifications laid out in 1956-57. The last Marut was withdrawn in 1990. Today one can only wonder what could have been possible if HAL and other development agencies like DRDO had the focus and competence of ISRO and the IAF had a long term view like the Indian Navy which working with Mazagon Docks & Cochin Shipyard has built up some meaningful indigenous capability in design and construction after having started in the early 1960s same as the HF-24. To develop a nations aviation industry you have to think in terms of a 50 year horizon and go step by step. 

THE PATH AHEAD

In mid-1980s the ASR was laid out for the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft. Once again it was an ambitious set of specifications calling for capabilities and technology such as fly by wire flight control systems, multi-mode pulse doppler radar and an afterburning turbofan engine in the 10,000 kgf class. These were technological assets which only the Americans (F-16 & F-15) had successfully put into service at that time, the French were about to (Mirage 2000) and the Soviets were still developing. Partly due to, once again, putting out highly stretched specifications and partly the bureaucratic approach of the agencies involved the Tejas took three decades to develop, has just been inducted into the IAF for operational breaking-in and is still maybe a year short of full scale operational service. The more things change the more they stay the same. 

The current generation of engineers & designers working on the Tejas cannot be blamed for woolly headed thinking of 33 years ago. We should cheer them and support them as they work to put the country's second indigenous fast combat aircraft into full operational service this year. Aerodynamically speaking the Tejas is a superb design and this time around with the adoption of the General Electric F404 afterburning turbofan we also have a winner of an engine.

Indian New Defence Acquisitions Insights

New defence acquisitions insights

The government is likely to pave the way for six new BrahMos supersonic cruise missile systems for the Indian Navy worth about Rs 2,700 crore besides taking a call on Army's proposal for acquiring BAE's M777 Ultra-Light Howitzers, in the Defence Acquisition Council meeting on Wednesday.

Defence sources said the issue of the US $2.5 billion Avro replacement programme is also likely to be discussed.

Besides the Avro, the big ticket proposal for Wednesday is six new BrahMos systems with 89 supersonic missiles. The cost of the project will be around Rs 2,700 crore, sources told PTI.

Another important proposal to be discussed is BAE Systems' offer to build a howitzer factory in India to close a deal valued at nearly US $800 million.

It was first considered by the UPA regime but underwent a quiet burial due to differences over price and offset commitments.

However, keen to sell its guns to India, the American company has offered to be part of the 'Make in India' initiative, sources said, adding that the firm is ready to set up an assembly line here with a local partner to make the guns domestically.

The sources said it would be a government to government deal between US and India.

The Army, which is in desperate need of new artillery guns, is keen that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) option be revived for BAE's guns and that a fresh Letter of Offer and Acceptance be floated to US.

Another key proposal that would come under discussion is the lone bid of Airbus-TATA consortium to replace IAF's ageing fleet of 56 Avro aircraft with C-295 transport carriers.

A final decision was anticipated in November last year but Parrikar had then sought more information about the necessity of the aircraft and the bidding process. Under the current defence procurement policy, single-vendor situation is not entertained unless cleared by the DAC.

World War II special: Did you know the Chinese Army once trained in India?

Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell inspecting Chinese troops Ramgarh

When the going got tough, Stilwell pulled back the troops into British India with the intention of training them.

It might now seem unthinkable, but there was a time when the Chinese Army actually trained on Indian soil, “somewhere in the north east”.

With Japan conquering most of China, United States and Nationalist China came together to fight the Axis power. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was the Allied Supreme Commander in the China Theater and he accepted President Roosevelt’s nominee Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell chief of staff of the combined forces.

But when the going got tough, Stilwell pulled back the troops into British India with the intention of training them.

In fact, as many as 20 Chinese divisions were trained in the US-run base of Ramgarh, now in Jharkhand, for a special campaign in Burma.

The following videos show Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell in Ramgarh. 

Indian Ocean - The 21st Century security dilemma between China and India

Great power competition in the Indian Ocean

Indian Ocean is where global struggles will play out in the twenty-first century. It is a “new great game” in the making.

Indian Ocean is the new theatre of ‘Great Power’ politics of the twenty-first century. With a tactical geopolitical landscape, the Indian Ocean- third largest waterway in the world surpassing the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as the world’s largest and most strategically significant maritime trade for global economy and security. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is surrounded by Africa, Asia and Australia serves as a maritime highway linking transcontinental human and economic relationships. In this context, the strategic importance of Indian Ocean can be best assessed in the prophetic words of maritime strategist Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, who famously stated: “Whoever attains maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean would be a prominent player on the international scene. Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This Ocean is the key to the seven seas in the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters.”

It is these prophetic words that forms the new pivot to the changing strategic dynamics in the Indian Ocean which Robert D. Kaplan envisaged as the ‘Centre Stage for the 21st Century’ whereby in the spiralling rivalry of a rising China and India, ‘Indian Ocean is where global struggles will play out in the twenty-first century’- a “new great game” in the making. With a gradual decline in U.S. dominance, the power struggle seem to have taken its initial roots, whereby both China and India are looking the “Mahanian way” in redirecting their gaze from the continent to the seas. In this view, the Indian Ocean is the new limit to China-India’s complex power politics- where both are determined to make it their nautical backyard. This strategic objective has added a maritime dimension to their geopolitical rivalry.

Indian Ocean: The Centre of Claim

Since the Indian Ocean has become the pivotal region in the economic and geopolitical configuration between the two rising Asian giants, thereby, making it the new security dilemma between the two competitors. This dilemma is created by the ‘defensive moves’ taken by one which is seen to reduce the security of the other.  Keeping this context, thereby, to understand the spiralling of tensions, it becomes imperative to assess the stakes that are involved for the two global actors. What makes Indian Ocean a duel ground between China and India is the fact that it is ‘home to important SLCOs (Sea Lanes of Communications) and maritime choke points’ such as the Straits of Hormuz, Babel-Mandeb Strait, Straits of Malacca, Lombok and the Sunda Straits- which form the vital routes for trade and energy (oil and gas) supplies. Together these carry over 50 per cent of the world’s container traffic and over 80 per cent of the world’s seaborne oil trade travels through this maritime corridor of the Indian Ocean. In this case, any disruption to the sea lines calls for severe security implications for the littoral states, which hinders their economic development. Thereby, to avoid any inherent risks of energy imports and transport bottlenecks, both China and India have adopted strategies such as- pursuing equity stakes in overseas upstream energy projects, building overland or underwater pipelines, investing in pariah states such as Iran, Myanmar, Sudan and others and by establishing Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPRs).

In this view, the strategic interest of both China and India to play an active and dominant role in the Indian Ocean is mainly driven by two factors. First is to procure and secure energy. The sudden rise of India and China as global economic powers has significantly increased their energy needs and their dependence on the Gulf for oil supplies. Since both China and India are heavy energy importers, Indian Ocean acts as the key route for international trade and energy (oil and gas) imports through the sea lanes. For China, 80 per cent of petroleum imports pass through the Indian Ocean into the Straits of Malacca, and for India, 75 per cent of its oil imports originates from the Persian Gulf and passes through the Straits of Hormuz. In this wrestle for energy security, Beijing’s ‘Malacca dilemma’ is matched with New Delhi’s ‘Hormuz Dilemma’. Thus, this quest for energy security has heightened the direct stakes of both the rising powers in maintaining the security and stability of the Indian Ocean region.

Secondly, the ambition for great power status in the Indian Ocean, in order to become a dominant player to project power and gain freedom of navigation in the crucial waters of the Indian Ocean. In this case, India’s dominant position in the Indian Ocean by virtue of its geographic location and, given its potential to be a great power together with its aspirations runs antagonistic to a rising China’s quest to gain strategic and hegemonic space in an off-shore region. In this great power rivalry, both India and China are engaged in the game of balancing and counter-balancing by means of engaging with each other’s peripheries. Both the powers are pursuing a policy of creating its own web of relationships with the littoral states both bilaterally and multilaterally-by investing in their economies, building ports and infrastructure, providing weaponry, and acquiring energy resources. For example, India is engaging through the ‘Look East Policy’- by economic and strategic engagement with mostly Myanmar, Vietnam and ASEAN. While China is building its ties through the ‘String of Pearls’, an ‘encirclement strategy’-of which Myanmar, Pakistan and SAARC are seen to be the most important platforms of exercising China’s Indian Ocean policy.

Increasing Military Muscle

With these motivations, both China and India are involved in flexing their military muscle in the Indian Ocean, which is reflective of their unequivocal desire to improve their ability to combat any kind of perceived threat to their critical sea lanes- which directly pose a challenge to their economic development. Therefore, China and India’s share a common national security strategy which aims to forge a link to the Indian Ocean in order to have an unimpeded market access, more direct energy supply lines, and the option of bypassing the dangerous bottlenecks at the sea lanes. To achieve this national interest, both the countries have adopted various strategic Indian Ocean policies.

In this view, China’s footprints in the Indian Ocean are visible in its surging naval activities by both and soft power tactics to increase its influence. Of which, the most recent activity (January 2014), is observed in the forays of the PLA Navy through the Lombok Strait near Indonesia into the Western Pacific- a navy drill conducted by a three-ship Chinese navy squadron, where the largest amphibious Chinese landing ship – Changbaishan - along with two destroyers -Wuhan and Haikou. This military activity of China is seen as its expansion into the waters in the eastern Indian Ocean, with an ability to operate in the off-shores bases. Chinese Navy’s field activities also include its participation in the joint anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia in 2011 and its ship to ship replenishment exercise in Eastern Indian Ocean in December 2013. While China has deployed three Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in active service as of 2007 and is also reported of deploying attack submarines. China has built naval outposts and China-friendly ports, such as- Sittwe and Coco Island in Myanmar, to Gwadar in Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and in Seychelles. Besides these strategic policies, Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 have proposed to build a ‘Maritime Silk Road’ to boost maritime connectivity with Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean.

Similarly, India is expanding its established maritime presence through developing its own network of bases, such as, the Indian naval station, INS Baaz, at the mouth of the Malacca Strait and an envisaged Chabahar port in Iran, which is situated adjacent to the Hormuz Strait. Apart from this, India has also stealthily spanned its interests in the Indian Ocean Rim- connecting with the islands of Mauritius, Maldives, Seychelles and Madagascar and the rim states of South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique. India has also beefed up its naval presence by positioning INS Chakra, a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) leased from Russia in active service and the Arihant-class SSBN,a nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine  in the Indian Ocean.And most importantly, the launch of India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier Vikrant in 2013 is seen as India’s “ambition to dominate the Indian Ocean” and heralding a greater Indian presence in the Pacific. India’s naval activities are reflective in its multilateral naval exercises (MILAN) with Indian Ocean states such as the Seychelles, Mauritius and the Maldives, along with bilateral naval exercises with Myanmar and Sri Lanka. India has invested some US$5 million for defence-related projects in the Seychelles, and has installed radar surveillance in the atolls of the Maldives.

In an overall assessment, it can thus, be rightly stated that China and India, with their competitive aspirations are going to shape the contours of twenty-first century global politics which is to be played in the Indian Ocean. Here, the new security dilemma between the two rising Asian powers is based on championing the sea power capabilities in order to control the Indian Ocean which is destined to decide the fate of Asia. Therefore, both China and India are looking the ‘Mahanian way’ in the Indian Ocean- the new ‘great game’ of the twenty-first century.

Can IAF rule the skies: Fighter fleet review of IAF

Clockwise from top right, SU 30 MKI, MIG-29, LCA Tejas, Rafale

Combat aircraft constitute the cutting edge of any air force and it holds good with the IAF as well. Modernisation and upgradation of combat platforms are ongoing processes that will help the IAF maintain the operational edge at all times. By the end of the 15th Five Year Plan, it is expected that the IAF inventory would consist largely of fourth and fifth generation platforms. Notwithstanding the depleting numbers that are being witnessed today, the continuing induction of new combat platforms such as the SU 30 MKI as well as the plans of acquiring the Rafale and the Tejas, the IAF would have the capability of long-range precision attack and of delivering conventional and nuclear weapons. This would give the IAF not just the necessary deterrence capability, but also a reliable second-strike capability.

During any interaction with the layman about the Indian Air Force (IAF), the discussion normally veers to the topic of ‘fighter aircraft’. The general public holds a greater fascination for the various types of aircraft in the combat fleet (read fighter fleet) of the IAF, as can be witnessed at any public gathering that has an air display or show, which has a fly-past at its culmination. Be it the Republic Day celebrations or the Air Force Day parade or any other such occasion, it is always the display by fighter aircraft that gets the maximum applause. The fascination is not restricted to just the man on the streets but even movies and television serials portray the combat fleet of the IAF as the ‘guardians of the Indian skies’. People seldom realise that the fighter aircraft of the IAF operate in close coordination with other weapon platforms and systems which, as a team, form a lethal combination but are rarely in the public eye.

Many leaders have stated in national and international fora that India has no territorial ambitions but would defend every inch of its territory and national security interests. During the annual Air Chief Marshal PC Lal Memorial Lecture in 2006, Shri Pranab Mukherjee, as the thenDefence Minister, mentioned, “India is not looking to impose its ideology on its neighbours, yet it has to be capable of safeguarding its extended frontiers from the Gulf of Aden to the Strait of Malacca.”

The former Prime Minister of India, Dr Manmohan Singh too had echoed similar thoughts in his address to the top brass of the Indian military during the Annual Armed Forces Commanders’ Conference in 2009. The nation has chosen to ensure the security of the area within the extended boundaries as it is through this region that all of the nation’s trade, commerce and energy requirements flow into the country. Sustained and a rapid economic growth since the beginning of the new century has placed the nation amongst the leading countries of the world.

Notwithstanding the temporary setback of the last decade, the new Modi-led National Democratic Alliance Government has once again managed to draw international focus onto India. The country’s economic rise, coupled with the continuously evolving geopolitical scenario, has placed additional responsibilities on the security forces of the nation, especially so on the IAF. The question then arises whether or not, the IAF has the wherewithal and capabilities in respect of the combat fleet, now and for the future, to match its constantly increasing role and responsibilities?

Looking Back

The modernisation programme for the IAF has been an ongoing process, a continuous evolution and it all began with the IAF becoming the first Air Force in South and South East Asia to be equipped with combat jets. In 1948, it acquired from the United Kingdom (UK) the Vampire jet fighter aircraft. Subsequently, the modernisation process moved ahead in giant leaps or crawled, depending upon various factors ranging mainly from bureaucratic meddling to political indifference to economic slowdown and paucity of funds.

Modernisation, as always, is a statement of a nation’s economic strength. It is an indicator of the country’s show of power in its region of influence and in the committee of nations. Through the decades after 1947, the IAF acquired the French Ouragon, renamed by the IAF as the ‘Toofani’, the Mystere once again from France, the Hunter, Canberra and the Gnat from the UK in the 1950s. The MiG 21 family of air defence aircraft and the Su-7 ground attack aircraft came from the then Soviet Union with induction beginning in the 1960s.

Following these acquisitions, other combat platforms were procured through the 1970s to 1980s, right through to the present times. These included the MiG 23 MF variable geometry air defence fighter aircraft, the MiG 23 BN variable geometry ground attack aircraft, the MiG 27 ground attack aircraft manufactured under license by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and the MiG 25 Foxbat high altitude strategic reconnaissance platform – all from the Soviet Union on attractive financial terms. From British Aerospace of the UK, the IAF received the Anglo-French Jaguar deep penetration strike aircraft and the Mirage 2000 delta wing multi-role combat a highly successful product from Dassault Aviation of France.

The acquisition programmes of the IAF today aimed at modernisation are a follow-on of what began with the Vampire jets, to initially attain, then sustain and when required, to regain its operational capability in response to the threats from our not-so-friendly neighbours and to meet regional commitments arising out of a continually evolving geopolitical situation.

Present Status of the IAF

In the 1960s, after two successive wars, one with China in 1962 and the other with Pakistan in 1965, several studies were conducted to suggest ways and means to strengthen the Armed Forces. One significant recommendation that emerged from the studies was that the IAF should be equipped with a total of 64 squadrons of which squadrons holding combat aircraft should total to 45. This strength was calculated to effectively meet the combined threat posed by the two hostile neighbours China and Pakistan. The closest to this figure of 64 squadrons that the IAF has so far been is to raise and maintain 39½ squadrons, a figure achieved during the 1970s and 1980s, when the maximum acquisitions took place.

Today, the strength of combat squadrons stands at 34 and this is likely to reduce further to 30 squadrons in the next three years or so with the older types such as the MiG 21 Bison and MiG 27 due to be retired from service having been overtaken by obsolescence reached the end of their total technical life. In the meantime, the Government has accorded approval for increase in the strength of the combat fleet to 42 squadrons by the end of the 14th Five-Year Plan i.e. in the period 2022 to 2027.

To arrest the rapid depletion in force levels that would undoubtedly result in the erosion of the operational potential, the IAF has embarked on the mid-life upgrade and modernisation of some the other fleets. These upgrades would help the fleets to render avant-garde service for another two to three decades, if not more.

MiG 29 Fleet

The upgrade of the MiG 29 fleet was initiated in 2007 and is likely to be completed in 2016. The task, of upgrading the 66 aircraft on the inventory, has been contracted to RAC MIG of Russia at a cost of $964 million (Rs 6,000 crore). Under the upgrade programme, the aircraft will have an enhanced fuel capacity, new airborne radar and other modern avionics as well as an upgraded power plant.

Mirage 2000 Fleet

The contract for the modernisation of the Mirage 2000 fleet of the 50-odd aircraft remaining on the inventory of the IAF was finalised in 2011 and the task is to be completed by mid-2021. As per the contract, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) will upgrade 46 of the aircraft after the first four have been upgraded in France. This would be under the clause of Transfer of Technology. The end-product will bring the Indian fleet to Mirage 2000-5 Mk 2 standard which includes a new radar system, weapon suite, missiles, Electronic Warfare (EW) systems and much more. The airframe is being stripped to the bare skeleton and rewired for the new avionics, mission computers, glass cockpit, helmet-mounted display, EW suites and other new fitments. These modifications would also enhance the total technical life of the aircraft. Along with the upgrade of the Mirage fleet, a separate contract with MBDA Company has also been signed for the supply of 450 MICA air defence missiles for the upgraded fleet.

Jaguar Fleet

The Jaguar twin-engine deep penetration strike aircraft has been in service with the IAF since 1979. The aircraft has a proven record of reliability and is currently operated in five squadrons of the IAF. After the acquisition of a few Jaguar aircraft initially from the United Kingdom (UK) in fly-away condition, the remaining platforms were manufactured under licence by HAL. The Jaguar fleet is now being upgraded by HAL in a $585 million (Rs 3,600 crore) contract and is likely to be completed by 2017.

The upgraded aircraft will have a multi-mode radar, glass cockpit, DARIN-III navigation and attack system avionics, Hands-on-Throttle-and-Stick (HOTAS) controls, an Integrated Defensive Aids Suite (IDAS) and more powerful engines from Honeywell. Even as the Jaguar fleet is being upgraded, the IAF is also keen for a replacement for the Jaguar fleet as it has already served the IAF for three and a half decades and will, in the next decade and a half, reach the end of its total technical life.

SU 30 MKI

As on date, the muscle of the combat aircraft fleet lies in the SU-30 MKI fleet. This fleet is scheduled to be built up by 2019 to a strength of 272 aircraft operating in 15 squadrons of the IAF.

The SU-30 MKI aircraft is an all-weather, heavy weight, long range air dominance fighter manufactured under licence by HAL under a $12 billion (Rs 72,000 crore) contract with Russia. This is a fourth generation aircraft modified specially to meet the needs of the IAF. It integrates Indian systems along with Israeli and French sub-systems on a Russian platform.

The fleet has provided the IAF with the capability and the strategic reach to counter any threat both within the nation’s airspace as well as in the region. The aircraft, though not initially designed to carry strategic weapons, is being modified to carry the air-launched version of the Indo-Russian Brahmos missile. It is also reported that the aircraft will be modified to carry the nuclear-capable Nirbhay missile too. Talks are on with Russia to upgrade the fleet to fifth-generation standards. If this plan is successful, this fleet will continue to operate in the Indian skies for at least another three to four decades.

The IAF of the Future

The IAF has laid considerable emphasis on building its core competencies because of decisive factors from recent conflicts and the continually evolving geo-political situation both within the region and beyond. The IAF has moved ahead to develop itself into a major component of national power with a capability of anti-access, target identification and force protection through swift and decisive application of technology and fire power. The impetus to its acquisition, upgrade and modernisation programmes is to not only regain but also substantially improve its operational capabilities. The progress is generally satisfactory. However, some programmes despite the best efforts, do have a few hiccups and delays.

Dassault Rafale/The Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA)

The original deal for 126 fighter aircraft under the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft contest began in 2007. Dassault Rafale was shortlisted in 2012 after rigorous evaluation but negotiations have been stuck over pricing and delivery guarantees for the aircraft manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) in India.

But now the direct purchase of 36 aircrafts will drive down the costs as there is no technology transfer involved and the delivery of aircraft will be faster.

The major reasons for the direct purchase of 36 Rafale jets from France are the fast-depleting fighter strength of the Indian Air Force, unending delays in the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft negotiations and the steep price rise.

The fighter aircraft strength has fallen drastically to 34 squadrons from the sanctioned 42 and is set to further dip with the phasing out of MiG-21s and MiG-27s in the next few years. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, has flagged the issue on several occasions. The MMRCA and the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas, the replacements, are nowhere on the horizon. Also with the price crossing $20 billion, funding this was a concern for the government with other major modernisation programmes in the offing.

But still the fate of original MMRCA deal is unknown.

Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas

The IAF is also facing delays in the induction of the indigenous product, the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) christened as the Tejas Mk I. On account of the phasing out of the MiG 21 fleet which is underway, the Tejas Mk I aircraft is so needed to augment its tactical air operations capability. It was hoped that the Final Operational Clearance (FOC) would only be a matter of time for the LCA, after attaining the Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) in early 2011. The progress has been tardy and the FOC has now been scheduled for June 2015.

HAL is already working on the development of Tejas Mk II that will be powered by the GE-414 engine, more powerful than the present GE-404 engine. At this point in time, the IAF has placed orders for 40 Tejas Mk I LCA. The IAF is prepared to wait for the LCA Tejas Mk II and hopes to have a fleet of 200 aircraft by 2022, a mix of both versions i. e. the Tejas Mk I and Mk II.

Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA)

Apart from the plans to acquire an upgraded fifth-generation version of the SU-30 MKI aircraft, the IAF has also been moving forward to realise India’s largest programme to acquire a ‘true-blood’ Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). India and Russia have signed an agreement to co-develop and co-produce the FGFA which will a customised version of the Russian T-50 PAK FA to meet with the specific requirements of the IAF. The T-50 PAK FA is currently in the test flight phase.

The FGFA will have features such as stealth, super-cruise and ultra-manoeuvrability, combined with modern weapon systems, which would give the aircraft the capability to switch roles in flight, a much-desired characteristic of a future aircraft dubbed as omni-role capability. The HAL, once again the partner for this venture, has committed $6 billion (Rs 36,000 crore) for the project, out of a total programme cost of about $30 billion (Rs 180,000 crore). Post the design phase in Russia, the manufacture of the aircraft will be undertaken at HAL in India. As things stand, the FGFA is likely to enter service from 2020 onwards and the IAF expects to build a fleet strength of about 144 aircraft.

NOTE: The indigenous AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) has been left out of the list since it is still in design phase and no prototypes are developed so far. Rumors about the purchase of other fighters similar to LCA Tejas is also not taken into account.

Conclusion

Combat aircraft constitute the cutting edge of any air force and so it is with the IAF as well. Modernisation and upgradation of combat platforms are ongoing processes that will help the IAF maintain the operational edge at all times. By the end of the 15th Five Year Plan, it is expected that the IAF inventory would consist largely of fourth and fifth generation platforms. Notwithstanding the depleting numbers that are being witnessed today, the continuing induction of new combat platforms such as the SU 30 MKI as well as the plans of acquiring the Rafale and the Tejas, the IAF would have the capability of long-range precision attack and of delivering conventional and nuclear weapons. This would give the IAF not just the necessary deterrence capability, but also a reliable second-strike capability.

With some of these aircraft types having multi-role capabilities, the IAF has the flexibility of deploying them as per the evolving strategic and tactical situation, either well beyond their unassisted range or through assistance of force-multipliers giving a tremendous boost to the operational potential. In 2032, the IAF would be celebrating its centenary year. In this century of dedicated service to the nation, the IAF’s inventory would have changed from Wapitis and Sopwith Camels, to state-of-the-art technology with an eye on the future. ‘Change’ is the keyword to move with the times. The fleet of combat aircraft available with the IAF today have and will, in the future, have the capacity to provide firepower on a timely basis, whatever the situation might be.

IAC-2 soon?

Image just for representation

Navy will present a report on the configuration options for the second indigenous Indian Aircraft Carrier (IAC-2) to the Ministry of Defense next month. At a recent seminar on the country’s naval aviation, it became clear that the vessel will likely be in the 65,000 ton class. It could be equipped with American aircraft – or a combination that might include the naval version of the French Rafale fighter. “The fighters must be transformational. We must decide on the aircraft first, and this choice must determine the design of the carrier and its deck,” said an official.

“We must plan for the future blue water navy that will be dependent on air power,” said former Chief of Naval Staff Arun Prakash. “A focus is required…new hardware is important (or) it will be a double jeopardy…we cannot remain hostage to an unreliable source of supply.” India’s navy now has two ski-jump carriers – the INS Vikramaditya which is a former Russian ship, and the INS Vikrant, which is the first indigenous carrier (IAC-1) and now in an advanced stage of construction. Both are equipped with Russian aircraft: Mig-29K combat jets and Kamov Ka-31 AEW helicopters.

The IAC-2 report will describe type, tonnage, propulsion and aircraft options, Chief of Navy Robin K Dhowan said. The options will include the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), that recently was recently offered by the US to India, as an alternative to a steam catapult system. Made by General Atomics, EMALS was specified as one of six ‘Pathfinder Projects’ for coproduction and co-development, in the recent U.S.-India Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI).

Depending on the cost, India could consider acquiring F-18s or the F-35B for IAC-2, Ashley Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said recently. With Indian having recently confirmed that the air force will acquire at least 36 Dassault Rafales, the carrier version of the French jet may come into consideration. The French Navy's flagship aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle has just completed an exercise with the Indian navy off the coast of Goa. Last month, Indian navy officials also went aboard the USS Charles Vinson off the coast of Cochin, to “ask questions about the carrier,” US Ambassador to India Richard Verma who accompanied them, told.

Meanwhile, the stage may finally be set for the Indian Navy to acquire a squadron of four Northrop Grumman E-2D Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft. The navy uses Kamov KA-31 for its AEW missions, but requires aircraft with a longer range and endurance. An RFI was issued as long ago as 2010, and Northrop Grumman has submitted a proposal for a shore-based version of the E-2D. Once the IAC-2 comes into operation, the aircraft could be modified for carrier operations in just one week, a US official told. But retired Vice Admiral A.K. Singh suggested that an AEW version of the V-22 Osprey might be the answer. “The tried and tested Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route could be considered for an early realization of the Navy’s requirements,” said Ankur Gupta, Manager, Ernst & Young India.

All you want to know about INS Kadamba Naval Base, India

Ariel view of INS Kadamba

Fleet: Indian Navy Western Naval Command
Built: 2005 (Phase I)
Facilities: Ship lift facility, harbour and anchorage, jetties, berthing facilities and naval ship repair yard

INS Kadamba is an integrated strategic naval base of the Indian Navy. Located on the western coast of India, the base can accommodate the operational fleet of Western Naval Command and reduce the traffic in the existing naval base located at Mumbai.

INS Kadamba is India's third functional naval base after those in Mumbai and Visakhapatnam. The base, which fully complies with the MARPOL regulations, was first built in 2005.

INS Kadamba location and layout

INS Kadamba is situated at Binaga Bay near Karwar in Karnataka. The base is spread over 5.14km of break water. It lies in the middle of the Western Ghats and the Arabian Sea in the west. The base receives natural protection and a strategic depth from deep bays. The hilly terrain around the base provides well camouflage to ground facilities.

INS Kadamba naval base history

"INS Kadamba is India's third functional naval base after those in Mumbai and Visakhapatnam."

The first phase of the base was commissioned in May 2005 under "Project Seabird". The $561.6m project was initiated by the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Oscar Stanley Dawson.

Construction of the first phase commenced in 1999 and was completed in 2005. It included a ship lift facility, harbour and anchorage, jetty, berthing facilities and accommodation facilities. INS Shardul became the first warship to be commissioned at INS Kadamba in January 2007.

INS Kadamba operations

INS Kadamba is the home port to the operational fleet of Western Naval Command of the Indian Navy. The base accommodates an aircraft carrier (INS Vikramaditya), destroyers, stealth frigates and submarines. The main functions of the base include the maintenance, overhaul and repair of surface and submarine fleet. The base strengthens the capabilities of the Indian Navy on the west coast.

INS Kadamba garrison facilities

The base's garrison facilities include a modern ship lift facility, harbour and anchorage, jetties, berthing facilities for 11 ships and a naval ship repair yard. The base also offers logistics to accommodate over 1,000 officers, sailors and families.

"INS Kadamba is the home port to the operational fleet of Western Naval Command of the Indian Navy."

The 10,000t ship lift facility, measuring 175m in length and 28m in width, features a ship lift and ship transfer system that can lift all vessels of Indian Navy, except large tanker-sized vessels and aircraft carriers.

The ship lift provides 625m of berthing space to handle up to ten ships. The base is designed to accommodate 42 vessels when fully operational. It currently accommodates 11 vessels and will handle 22 ships following the completion of second phase development. The bays have adequate depth to allow large vessels such as aircraft carriers to enter and dock at the base.

Other base facilities and services

The base also provides facilities and services to the on-duty members and mariners. The facilities include a township consisting of accommodation for officers and sailors, a shopping centre, sailors institute, schools, a family clinic and welfare centre.

The base also houses a depot ship, parade ground, drill shed, logistics complex, officers' mess and in-living complex for sailors. A modern hospital known as INHS Patanjali was commissioned in December 2006. The 141-bed hospital features operation theatres, modern monitors and RVG digital radiography systems.

INS Kadamba naval base development

Project Seabird is being developed on a 4,480ha area of land, of which only 400ha is being used for construction while the remaining will be used for afforestation. The second phase of the project was started in 2012 and is due for completion by 2017-18.

Phase II will include a new naval air station, a naval research institute, a transmission station, a naval weapon yard and additional berthing facilities for 50 naval vessels. The new naval air station will comprise a 6,000ft runway. The state government of Karnataka and the Airports Authority of India are in discussions with the Ministry of Defence to plan for an international airport.

India to slowly but steadily boost military presence in Andaman and Nicobar Islands

Floating Dock Navy (FDN) INS Jarawa of the Indian Navy

India is going ahead with its plan to crank up military force-levels and infrastructure in the strategically-located Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) in a bid to effectively counter China's strategic moves in the Indian Ocean Region as well as ensure security of sea lanes converging towards Malacca Strait. 

The ANC has largely failed to live up to its initial promise when it was established in 2001 as the country's first unified and till now only "theatre" command, with all the land, sea and air military forces under one operational commander. 

The reasons vary from a fund crunch and lack of environmental clearances to build infrastructure to the internecine turf wars among Army, Navy and IAF. The ANC currently has just an infantry brigade (3,000 soldiers), 20 small warships and patrol vessels, and a handful of Mi-8 helicopters and Dornier-228 maritime patrol aircraft. 

But "a very big plan" is underway to progressively bolster the country's last military outpost or easternmost bastion. "All the three services are involved. ANC will get better equipped in terms of force-levels and infrastructure over time. It has been given top priority by the defence ministry," said Admiral Robin Dhowan. 

"There will be more jetties for warships, airstrips and extended runways for aircraft. The A&N Islands are, after all, a strategic asset located close to the Malacca Strait," added the Navy chief. 

Asked about expanding Chinese naval forays in the IOR, Admiral Dhowan said, "The increase in Chinese presence is not new. They have been conducting anti-piracy escort duties in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. They are here to protect their trade. Their nuclear and conventional submarines come from time to time but there is no exponential increase." 

India, of course, also needs to strengthen the ANC to effectively protect its almost 6,00,000 sq km of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) spread out in the region, which is around 30% of the country's total EEZ of 2.01 million sq km.

Sources say ANC should eventually have a division-level force (around 15,000 troops), a fighter squadron and some major warships after enhancing the support and maintenance infrastructure in the 572-island cluster with more "operational turn-around bases" and other facilities. 

Under the overall "island development plan", which includes a new naval air station at Campbell Bay, the existing runways at Campbell Bay and Shibpur are to be extended, while more airstrips are proposed in the archipelago. 

Incidentally, larger warships like destroyers and frigates as well as Sukhoi-30MKI fighters and C-130J Super Hercules aircraft configured for "special operations" have operated from the region for exercises over the last few years.

India, Iran sign pact on developing Chabahar port

Chabahar Port

Notwithstanding US objections, India on Wednesday went ahead with the signing of an agreement with Iran for the development of the strategically important Chabahar port which will give India sea-land access route to Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan.

The pact was signed after comprehensive talks between visiting Road Transport and Highways Minister Nitin Gadkari with the Iranian leadership. "The MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) was signed after the talks between the two sides," a source said.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, in his meeting with Gadkari, said, "Resumption of Iran-India cooperation in the southeastern Iranian port city of Chabahar would lead to a new chapter in relations of two countries."

Chabahar port is located in Sistan-Balochistan Province on Iran's southeastern coast and is of great strategic utility for India which will get sea-land access route to Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan. The US has been asking India and other countries not to "rush" into doing business with Iran as Washington was yet to work out a deal with Tehran on the latter's contentious nuclear programme.

The port will be used to ship crude oil and urea, saving India transportation costs. India intends to lease two berths at Chabahar for 10 years. The port will be developed through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which will invest $85.21 million to convert the berths into a container terminal and a multi-purpose cargo terminal.

The agreement was signed by Gadkari and Iran's Minister for Transport and Urban Development Dr Abbas Ahmad Akhoundi. "With the signing of this MoU, Indian and Iranian commercial entities would now be in a position to commence negotiations towards finalisation of a commercial contract under which Indian firms will lease two existing berths at the Port and operationalise them as container and multi-purpose cargo terminals," a Ministry of External Affairs statement said.

"The availability of a functional container and multi-purpose cargo terminal at Chabahar Port would provide Afghanistan's garland road network system alternate access to a sea port, significantly enhancing Afghanistan's overall connectivity to regional and global markets, and providing a fillip to the ongoing reconstruction and humanitarian efforts in the country," it said.

Touching upon Iran and India's ancient and historical relations, Rouhani, in his meeting with Gadkari, underscored that undoubtedly the level of mutual cooperation could be expanded day by day. Pointing to Iran's transit position for connecting east to west and north to south, he stressed that the Islamic Republic could play a pivotal role in connecting India to Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe via railway.

President Rouhani reiterated that Iran is fully ready to lure foreign investors. Noting the importance of North-South Transport Corridor and development of Iranian ports, Rouhani stressed that Iran fully welcomes the Indian investors to make investment in construction of roads, railways and development of Chabahar port and other southern ports in Iran. Referring to the cordial relations between the two countries, Gadkari said New Delhi is fully ready to cooperate with Tehran on development of Chabahar port.

Last year in October, India had approved the framework of an inter-governmental Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for setting up an USD 85.21 million joint venture firm for equipping two fully-constructed berths at Chahbahar port.

As per the framework, approved in the Cabinet last year, an Indian joint venture company would lease two fully constructed berths in Chahbahar port's Phase-I project for a period of ten years, which could be renewed by "mutual agreement". The Indian side will transfer ownership of the equipment to be provided through the investment to Iran's port and Maritime Organisation (P&MO) without any payment at the end of the tenth year.

The Cabinet had given nod for constituting a Joint Venture or other appropriate Special Purpose Vehicle comprising the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust and the Kandla Port Trust.

Approval was also given for incurring annual revenue expenditure of $22.95 million to support operational activities of the Indian Joint Venture. From Chahbahar port using the existing Iranian road network, a link up to Zaranj in Afghanistan and then using the Zaranj-Delaram road constructed by India in 2009, access to Afghanistan's Garland Highway can be made.

Fire from the sky: The 3 most deadly Air Forces in Asia

SU 30 MKI of Indian Air Force

Airpower has played a critical role in the conflicts that have set the Asian political scene since World War II. From the Korean War to the Vietnam Conflict to the several wars between India and Pakistan, air forces have helped tip the strategic balance in war, and frame the terms of peace.

But effective air forces need more than flashy fighters.  They need transport aircraft that can provide strategic and tactical airlift, and Aerial Early Warning (AEW) planes that can maintain surveillance and control of the sky.  They need a defense-industrial base that can keep the warplanes in the air. This article looks at the three most effective air forces in Asia, in the context of their ability to put planes in the sky, to make sure those planes are well flown, and maintain a reliable supply and procurement base.

Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF)

The JASDF was established in 1954 as the air branch of the Japanese Self Defense Force, the quasi-military mandated by the post-World War II peace treaty. Over the decades, Japan has combined its own high level of technical sophistication with a series of airframes provided by the United States to field a formidable force.

The JASDF is well stocked with modern, capable aircraft. It flies over 300 generation 4 and 4.5 fighters (F-15s and F-2s), supplemented by an older group of F-4 Phantoms. It maintains a large AEW fleet, along with a squadron of tankers capable of keeping its fighters in the air.

The Japanese also have a reputation for high quality. The JASDF regularly participates in American Red Flag exercises, and in recent years held joint training with the Republic of Korea Air Force. Recently, the JASDF’s pace of operations has exceeded even that of the Cold War, as North Korean, Russian, and Chinese provocations have kept the branch on its toes.

Japan’s procurement programs have not always gone smoothly.  The F-2 project produced a fighter mildly more capable than the F-16 at much greater cost, although it did keep defense money at home. Japan also seems likely to purchase the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in significant numbers, and we do not as of yet have a handle on how this purchase will affect the readiness and capabilities of the force.

Indian Air Force (IAF)

During the Cold War, the IAF was one of only a few air forces to use Soviet aircraft to good effect, enjoying a great deal of success in its various wars against Pakistan.  India combined Soviet technology with a British system of training and management, which left it relatively well prepared when challenged by Pakistan’s Western aircraft.

The four Cope India exercises between 2004 and 2009 demonstrated that Indian pilots have maintained their edge. Using a variety of tactics, the Indians managed to go toe-to-toe with the best that the US Air Force had to offer. Even granting that the USAF was trying to make the case for the F-22 at the time, the IAF performed very effectively.

India flies over 300 generation 4 and 4.5 fighter aircraft, supplemented by a large fleet of MiG-21s.  On the support side,  the Indians operate a roughly 200 strong fleet of ground attack aircraft. The IAF has also stepped up its important ancillary duties. It is acquiring C-17 Globemasters to manage its heavy lift responsibilities, and has respectable aerial refuelling and AEW capabilities.

Two huge question marks remain.  The first involves India’s commitment to its joint PAK-FA project with Russia.  The fighter has huge potential, but has suffered from numerous, predictable teething problems.

The other issue involves the struggle to purchase Dassault Rafale fighters from France.  After years of trying to navigate the Indian procurement system, the French government seems equal part desperate and exasperated.  The delivery of Rafales would undoubtedly improve the quality and reliability of the force, as well as ensure a good backup relationship if the PAK FA fails to pan out.

People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)

Thirty years ago, the PLAAF was huge, but ungainly.  It possessed a tremendous number of obsolescent interceptors, along with a cadre of poorly trained pilots.  China’s aviation industry struggled to produce third generation fighters.

Things have changed.  China now operates over six hundred generation 4 and 4.5 fighters, complimented by a large group of older interceptors and strike aircraft.  China has produced most of these aircraft, including the J-10 and J-11, domestically.  China is working on two major new fighter projects, including the J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters.

The PLAAF also operates a growing fleet of heavy airlift, tactical airlift, and AEW aircraft.  Over the past decade, it has rapidly increased its aerial refueling capabilities, giving the force extensive reach along China’s borders and into the East and South China Seas.

The PLAAF has also stepped up training, including setting up its own counterpart to Red Flag. Chinese pilots fly far more hours now than they did even a decade ago, often seeing more cockpit time than their American counterparts.

Of course, Chinese industry still struggles with quality control, especially with respect to engines.  The Chinese military industrial complex also depends too much on the appropriation of foreign technology, through means both fair and foul. Nevertheless, in terms of airframes, pilots, and industrial capacity, China is now the most important aviation player in Asia.

Several other great air forces fly the skies of the Asia-Pacific. Pound for pound, the Republic of Korea Air Force may be tougher than any of the services listed here.  However, the ROKAF still lacks an advanced, domestic fifth generation fighter project, and has not developed aerial refueling capabilities. And of course, including the United States Air Force, which distributes a considerable portion of its strength into the Pacific, would have revised this list.