Indira Gandhi considered military strike on Pakistan’s nuke sites, claims CIA document

Indira Gandhi

Returning to power in 1980, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had considered a military strike on Pakistan’s nuclear installations to prevent it from acquiring weapons capabilities, a declassified CIA document has claimed.

Such a consideration by the then Indian Prime Minister was being made when the US was in an advanced stage of providing its fighter jets F-16 to Pakistan, says the September 8, 1981, document titled ‘India’s Reaction to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan’, which was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

A redacted version of the 12-page document was posted on the CIA website in June this year, according to which the then Indian government led by Gandhi in 1981 was concerned about the progress made by Pakistan on its nuclear weapons programme and believed that Islamabad was steps away from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The US had the same assessment.

“In the extreme case, if Indian concerns increase over the next two or three months, we believe the conditions could be ripe for a decision by Prime Minister Gandhi to instigate a military confrontation with Pakistan, primarily to provide a framework for destroying Pakistan’s nuclear facilities,” the then highly sensitive CIA report claimed.

At the time of writing of the report, the CIA said Gandhi had not taken any such decision in that regard. According to the report, as Pakistan was in an advanced stage of producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons, Gandhi evidently responded to the threat by authorising Indian nuclear test preparations.

“In February (1981), excavation was begun in the Thar desert to permit the underground explosion of an Indian test device on short notice,” the CIA said, adding that in May, preparations had been completed by India for a 40-kiloton nuclear test.

The CIA said India reportedly was to explode the device about one week after the expected Pakistani test. “Evidently, the Indian Government calculated that a Pakistani nuclear explosion per se would not constitute a national security threat, and that the damage to India’s image of pre-eminence in the region could be minimised by a resumption of the peaceful nuclear explosive (PNE) programme,” the CIA said.

“Prime Minister Gandhi probably has not made a decision to exercise a military option against Pakistan. In the extreme case, if India’s concern about deliveries of F-16s to Pakistan increases before the optimum time for exercising the military option (in October or November according to one report), the conditions could be ripe for Prime Minister Gandhi to carry out the contingency strike plan,” it said.
“Our best estimate, however, is that India will follow a wait and see strategy,” the report added.

Eight Army men get a huge pat for ‘daring’ Myanmar operations

Army personnel involved with Myanmar operations posing in front of ALH Dhruv

Eight Army personnel from 21 Para Regiment who took part in operations across the Myanmar border in June are among the 67 gallantry award recipients approved by President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Pranab Mukherjee on the eve of 69th Independence Day.

The “daring” Myanmar operation along the “Indo-Myanmar border” also found mention in Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s customary Independence Day address to the armed forces personnel. “I compliment the Special Forces for undertaking this surgical strike smoothly and without any casualty on our side,” Mr. Parrikar said.

The 67 gallantry awards include two Kirti Chakras, 10 Shaurya Chakras, one Bar to Sena Medal, 49 Sena Medals, two Nao Sena Medals and three Vayu Sena Medals.

The Kirti Chakra awardees include Lieutenant Colonel Nectar Sanjenbam who led the 21 Para Regiment into Myanmar and Naib Subedar Rajesh Kumar (posthumously) who died fighting terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir in October last year.

Of the 10 Shaurya Chakras while five went to the army, Navy and Air Force got one each and three were conferred to personnel under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Colonel MN Rai from Gorkha regiment who died fighting terrorists in Kashmir in January was conferred Shaurya Chakra posthumously.

Commander Mohan Milind Mokashi, Commanding Officer of INS Sumitra, got a Shaurya Chakra for playing a pivotal role in evacuating Indian nationals from Yemen under ‘Operation Rahat.’

“His brave efforts resulted in successful evacuation of 1621 evacuees, during five different operations, which he undertook from the Port of Aden, Port Ash Shihr and Port Al Hodeidah,” the citation reads.

Coast Guard personnel were awarded one President’s Tatrakshak Medal (PTM) and seven Tatrakshak Medals (TM) for displaying conspicuous acts of gallantry, distinguished and meritorious services. In addition, the President has also awarded one PTM for distinguished service and two TMs for meritorious service.

Commandant Chandra Shekhar Joshi, commander of Coast Guard ship Rajratan, which was involved in an operation that led to sinking of a Pakistani boat in December last year, got the President’s Tatrakshak Medal.

Missing some muscle

Border Security Force personnel patrolling the fenced border with Pakistan

The capture of fidayeen Mohammad Naved alias Qasim Khan - call him Qasab II - during a terrorist attack in Udhampur, just days after the assault on Gurdaspur, is a significant achievement of the security forces and village defence squads. It also shows the determination of the handlers in Pakistan to disrupt and derail the 68th Independence Day celebrations and the proposed NSA-level talks and test the new government's tolerance threshold.

In a significant policy shift the government has not called off the NSA talks as it is determined to confront Pakistan with the live evidence of a Qasab II. However, the element that has been missing from India's policy of combating cross-border terrorism for decades is retribution.

While deeply analytical, the mention of an Indian deterrent to fend off such terror attacks from Pakistan is conspicuous by its absence in recent articles on the Gurdaspur attack. It is this missing ingredient of India’s internal security policy that has encouraged Islamabad to expand the geography and frequency of cross-border terrorism beyond J&K to Punjab, for the first time after the 26/11 strikes on Mumbai in 2008.

No deterrence

Speaking in Mumbai this week on the use of hard power, National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval emphasised the need for India to have a “deterrence against attacks on its soil”. This rephrasing of similar comments made earlier suggests that an appropriate but belated response is in the making.

In his very erudite article, M. K. Narayanan, a former NSA, writes at length about the challenges posed by terrorism emanating from Pakistan. He proposes that as cross-border terrorism intensified in J&K, it declined in Punjab. Now, he says, as terrorism has declined in J&K, it may return in Punjab, where conditions are ripe for an escalation . He is right. The linkage between Kashmir and Khalistan was made by the ISI in its famous “K2 Project” attempted in early 1990s but the idea of Khalistan was nipped in the bud by the Punjab police.

However, while Mr Narayanan makes an inventory of defensive measures, there is not a whiff of how to punish Pakistan. The steadfast pursuit of “not losing an inch of land” has, sadly, bred a passive and defensive mindset among Indian security forces.

In the run-up to the hanging of Yakub Memon, the word 'deterrent' was dropped by political leaders and intellectuals like confetti at a wedding. Retribution has a sobering effect on sponsors of terror and Pakistan's indefatigable pursuit of it has been whetted by the absence of a response. The attacks in Gurdaspur and Udhampur are stark reminders of this.

Policy dead end

Despite a strenuous spin to its Pakistan policy, portrayed as more muscular than that of the UPA , it is becoming clear that the new government has hit a cul de sac. After raising the bar for resuming the dialogue process, it has had to make a dramatic climbdown. As the international border and LoC resonate with artillery, there is no sign of restoration of calm.Terror and talks will go hand-in-hand when the two NSAs, armed with their respective dossiers on Gurdaspur and Udhampur, and R&AW meet on August 23 and 24 at New Delhi.

What has changed is the language of warnings to Pakistan. Home Minister Rajnath Singh has threatened to give a 'befitting reply'. In a chaotic Rajya Sabha, over the din, he vowed “an effective and forceful response” to the Dinanagar assault by the Pakistani fidayeen whom he referred to as “enemies of India”. Earlier, Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar had made a generic remark that the response to terror will be “disproportionate and unpredictable and at a time and place of our choosing”. Be it Dinanagar or Udhampur, the charade of a “befitting reply” is repeated ad nauseum on Indian TV channels, where supercharged anchors, accompanied by their over-enthusiastic panelists, pay back their Pakistani counterparts in high decibels with choice invectives, recounting the history of treachery in fouled battles and clandestine campaigns. Calling Pakistanis 'cowards' appears to be the acme of retribution.

We are told that new fences and walls are to be put up to prevent terrorists from swimming across the Ravi river that the fidayeen crossed last month to surprise the Dinanagar police station. In the past we have built canals and ditch-cum-bunds, erected minefields and smart fencing on the IB and LoC and adopted anti-and counter-infiltration and counter-insurgency grids by thickening troop density. These measures have contained insurgency in J&K, but not brought an end to it. The focus now, as in the past, is strengthening defensive measures.

Forceful language

Is India being self-deterred from delivering a befitting reply? Over the last several months, signals emanating from NSA Ajit Doval and Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar were very encouraging. Mr Parrikar spoke about using terrorists to remove terrorists and re-creating deep assets dismantled by default earlier. Mr Doval has been urging Pakistan to end terrorism and at least once warned: “you do another Mumbai, you lose Balochistan.”

One must assume that the befitting reply - effective, forceful, disproportionate and unpredictable - is in the making, to be delivered at a time and place of India's choosing. Translating words into an actionable deterrent is the challenge for policymakers.

Two other aspects require attention: prevention of and a quicker response to the fidayeen assaults. The guru of counter-terrorism K .P.S. Gill, under whose charge Khalistan terrorism was ended in Punjab, stated after the Dinanagar attack: “You don't prepare for terrorism after it has happened.” Fidayeen infiltrate across the LoC/IB, strike targets in Jammu and some even get away. Over the years, the Indian security forces have frequently dealt with terrorists holed up in villages and hideouts in the Srinagar vallley and elsewhere. All the operational experience to end a crisis situation has been assimilated but not institutionalised for re-use. That is why units take inordinately long to finish the operation.

The lackadaisical deportment of personnel at the Dinanagar police station showed the absence of operational readiness and preparedness despite the general alert. Counter-terrorism skills, acquired by the Punjab police in early 1990s, were obviously not passed down; else the response would have been more professional and the police post would not have caved in. It took all of 12 hours for Punjab police's SWAT team, trained in Israel, to overcome three fidayeen. As one watched on TV the melee of troops, police and onlookers, it was obvious that the lessons of Mumbai had not been heeded: of no live coverage of counter-terrorism operations. Closure was brought half a day after the attack, with the fidayeen given live coverage and the ultimate oxygen of publicity. An American woman trapped in Taj Mumbai during 26/11 on her rescue at the end of the operation while exiting the hotel angrily told a police officer: “there were six terrorists. And you took three days”.

In Dinanagar and Udhampur, Pakistan was testing India's response to a terror attack, the first outside J&K after Mumbai. Some government sources are claiming that the civilian government in Pakistan was unaware of these attacks. That is possible, even probable. However, the autonomy of the Punjab-based terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammad acting independently of the ISI is unlikely. Either way, it ducks two questions: how will India respond to the next big attack sourced in Pakistan; and why is the deterrent overt or covert or both, taking so long to materialise? Is it the lack of political will? Because the man on the street is asking “iska kuchh hoga” (will something be done of this) to end cross-border terrorism. The government must give a befitting reply.

-Ashok. K Mehta
Originally published on "The Hindu".
(Maj. Gen. Mehta (retd.) was a founder- member of the Defence Planning Staff, now the Integrated Defence Staff.)

Chinese media see border meet a step forward

Indian Army and PLA officers before border meeting

The Chinese state media is praising the opening of the fifth border meeting point between India and China at Daulat Beg Oldie in Ladakh as a major step to keep the frontiers calm.

Yet, acknowledging that the process to strengthen peace and tranquillity was being incrementally and consistently strengthened, diplomatic sources told The Hindu that it would be “premature” to conclude that Sino-Indian ties have already been fundamentally realigned.

“That could happen and we are hopeful, but we are still looking at specific and definitive markers which would indeed demonstrate and repose confidence that the relationship has been firmly re-tracked,” the sources observed.

People’s Daily, China’s official newspaper, is quoting from an article which had first appeared in the state-run tabloid Global Times, in which analysts said that Sino-Indian ties were “getting warmer in many aspects” as this was the second border meeting point to be set up between the two countries over the past year.

The August 1 designation of Daulat Beg Oldie as a border meeting point was also symbolically significant as it coincided with the celebration of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Day.

In May, the two countries opened another border meeting point in Kibithu in Arunachal Pradesh, called South Tibet by China. There have also been media reports citing the scope of complementarity and reconciliation of China’s Belt and Road initiative with India’s Act East Policy.

However, sources pointed out that the Indian side was yet to pick any clear signals, which would suggest that the Chinese position was shifting on big-ticket bilateral issues. For instance, during the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Ufa in Russia on the sidelines of the summit of the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping, “there was no visible change in the Chinese position on the China-Pakistan economic corridor, which passed through parts of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir,” the sources observed.

During his visit to China in May, the Prime Minister had also imparted urgency to clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), without prejudice to the positions held by either country on the final resolution of the boundary question.

The sources stressed that India had defined a minimalist approach, where tensions would be significantly eased if the two sides shared information on each other’s perception of the LAC.
Without elaborating, the sources pointed out that the Chinese had previously signalled a shift in their position on resolving the crisis in Afghanistan, but of late Beijing “did not seem to be particularly accommodative of Indian interests” in Kabul.

The Chinese were also following a hyphenated approach by tying support to India’s membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), with Pakistan’s request, the sources said.

“The Sino-Indian relationship has definitely been energised in all spheres at the highest level over the past year but we are still waiting to scale some of the defining hurdles,” they observed.

Nagaland: A long road to peace

Naga men performing a traditional war dance during the Hornbill festival

It is a 97-year-old struggle. To initiate even the beginnings of closure is a major breakthrough. And to have achieved that by recognising the Naga people’s pride, culture and history crowns the accord with renewed hope.

Poignancy, laced with a sense of Naga pride and aspirations, can best describe the responses to the August 3 Naga Peace Accord signed between the NSCN (I-M) and the government of India. This can only be understood by talking to those living in Nagaland. On August 4, I received an early morning phone call from Zunheboto town (Zunheboto in Sumi dialect refers to a flowering shrub) in Nagaland. The sober voice of one of my young Naga friends broke the silence across the miles as she whispered, “Sister, finally, we do have closure, right?” followed by a spell of silence pregnant with meaning. I knew that she was brimming with emotions — pride amidst hurt; dignity amidst insecurity. I recalled Martin Luther King, Jr.’s lines from the movie Selma: “this is a demonstration of our dignity”.

That is what the Naga struggle has meant to me: a demonstration of the Nagas’ pride and dignity as a people. This, notwithstanding the violence and the insurgency, the fear and the insecurity and a life lived in uncertainty. Naga-inhabited areas resonate with a sense of unique history and culture - the National Socialist Council of Nagaland NSCN (Isak-Muivah) represents both.

The ethnic Naga movement began its journey in 1918 with the formation of the Naga Club by 20 Naga members of the French Labour Corps, who had served in World War-I in Europe. The wartime knowledge motivated the few who came in contact with the European battlefield to politically organise themselves as a distinct ethnic entity. It also aroused in them a feeling of Naga nationalism, which shaped the idea of a ‘Naga nation’.

The Club submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1929, in which it stated that the people of Naga areas and those of mainland India had nothing in common between them and hence the Nagas should be left alone. In 1946, Naga National Council (NNC), a successor to the Naga Club, was formed under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo. Phizo, with the collaboration of eight other Nagas, declared Naga independence on August 14, 1947. In a 1951 speech, Phizo argued, “In the name of the Naga National Council and on behalf of the people and citizens of Nagaland, I wish to make our stand and our national position clear. We are a democratic people, and as such, we have been struggling for a Separate Sovereign State of Nagaland in a democratic way through constitutional means as it is so called. We shall continue to do so”.

It is important to note that several efforts were made to resolve the Naga issue. On June 27-28, 1947, the Akbar Hydari Agreement was signed between the then Governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari and the NNC, in which the Nagas’ right to freely develop themselves was respected. However, Clause 9 of the Hydari Agreement created divisions as it stated, “The Governor of Assam as the Agent of the Government of the Indian Union will have a special responsibility for a period of 10 years to ensure the observance of the agreement, at the end of this period the Naga Council will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding the future of Naga people arrived at”. This was interpreted by the NNC as terminating in sovereignty.

The NNC took to arms in 1955. Indian security forces responded with counter-insurgency operations, which resulted in the imposition of the Assam Disturbed Areas Act on the Naga Hills on August 27, 1955. This later became the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, further amended in 1972.

Those were turbulent times in Naga history, with the landscape plagued by violence, counter-insurgency and civilian deaths. The hills came alive with a complex mix of political ideology, a desire for self-determination, ethnic alignments and tribal divisions. It was not an easy situation to deal with. The insurgency and the deployment of armed forces resulted in civilian deaths.

In 1963, as a mechanism for conflict resolution, the Nagaland State was established. Yet, the insurgency continued, as most Naga inhabited areas were left outside the purview of the new State. In 1964, a Nagaland Peace Mission was created and a ceasefire agreement was signed that lasted till 1968. After years of violence, another effort at peace was attempted with the signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975, where the NNC members agreed to give up violence and accept the Indian Constitution.

However, Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu, then members of the NNC, interpreted the Shillong Accord as a complete sellout and revolted, going on to form the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. S.S. Khaplang, who now heads NSCN (K), was a member of the unified NSCN that split in 1988 to form the two divisions: NSCN (I-M) and the NSCN (K).

This history of the struggle is important as a backdrop to understand the significance of the Naga peace accord signed on August 03. NSCN (I-M) under Muivah and Swu have held to the ceasefire since its signing in 1997.

The ceasefire by NSCN (I-M) attained greater significance after NSCN (K) abrogated its ceasefire on March 27, 2015. Also, unlike NSCN (K), whose leader Khaplang has failed to maintain unity within the group, the NSCN (I-M)’s leaders and cadres have stayed with it since 1988.

Where the NSCN (I-M) has succeeded while groups like NSCN (K) have failed is in establishing a presence across all Naga-inhabited areas. It has achieved this by holding regular People’s Consultative Meetings (PCMs) with groups such as the Naga Hoho; Naga Students’ Federation; Forum for Naga Reconciliation; and the larger Naga civil society across States.

The PCMs have reinforced the much-needed local social networks that are the mainstay of any insurgent group. This largely representative structure has also kept violence in check and created an accountability mechanism where aspirations for Naga dignity and pride have taken centre stage.

It is notable that the NSCN (I-M) has shown flexibility in relegating the sovereignty clause to the background and bringing to the fore the issue of Naga identity - a more negotiable factor with the Central government.

Consequently, as I read through the Prime Minister’s speech at the signing ceremony that set the framework for a peaceful resolution to the Naga insurgency, his emphasis on restoring a sense of dignity, pride and respect to the Naga people stood out. This, as the 97-year-old Naga struggle will tell you, is the core issuefor the Nagas - a recognition of their history, dignity and culture.

The details of the Accord are yet to be made public, especially on how the NSCN (I-M)’s complicated political demand for a ‘Greater Nagalim’, comprising areas in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur will be negotiated. However, the biggest breakthrough is that the group has agreed to give up violence and resolve all issues peacefully. For now, this Accord has ushered in hope, bringing joy mixed with poignant memories to my friend from Zunheboto and that matters the most.

(Dr. Namrata Goswami is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. E-mail: namygoswami@gmail.com)